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THE  MANY  AND  VARIED  ROLES  OF  HISTORY  IN
CONSTITUTIONAL  ADJUDICATION
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Appeals to history, and to the authority of decisions made in the past,
occur nearly ubiquitously in constitutional law.  For the most part, these
appeals occasion little specific notice or methodological controversy.  There
is, of course, a sharp, ongoing, frequently overheated debate about constitu-
tional originalism—a theory, or family of theories, that holds, roughly, that
the original meaning of the constitutional language is both unchanging and,
insofar as it is clear and determinate, almost invariably controlling.1  But
increasingly tired, stylized debates of the form “Originalism: For or Against?”
tend to obscure three deep truths about constitutional interpretation.
© 2015 Richard H. Fallon, Jr.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am
grateful to Curt Bradley, Dan Meltzer, Jim Pfander, and Amanda Tyler for extremely
helpful comments on prior drafts, to comments from my fellow panelists (A.J. Bellia, Brad
Clark, Tara Grove, and Justice Antonin Scalia) and members of the audience (especially
Scott Dodson) at a session of the Federal Courts Section of the American Association of
Law Schools on “The Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon,” and to Max Rosen for
outstanding research assistance.
1 On varieties of originalism, see generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living
Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244–45 (2009) (describing originalism as a “smorgasbord of
distinct constitutional theories”).  Although all originalists appear to agree that the “origi-
nal meaning (‘communicative content’) of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each
provision is framed and ratified,” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Con-
struction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013), they disagree about such matters as (1) the
nature of the historical phenomena that fix constitutional meaning, (2) whether constitu-
tional “meaning” suffices to dictate the outcome of constitutional cases or must be supple-
mented in some cases by judge-created constitutional “construction,” and (3) whether
courts should ever decide constitutional cases based on precedents that deviate from the
Constitution’s original (and fixed) meaning. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist
Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5, 6–14 (2011).  Although most of the versions of originalism currently on offer
are not sufficiently clearly defined to avoid considerable discretion in application, more
determinate forms are in principle possible. See id. at 15–20.
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First, nearly all of those who characterize themselves as nonoriginalists
readily acknowledge the importance to constitutional adjudication of evi-
dence bearing on the original meaning of constitutional language.2  Cases in
which nonoriginalist Justices of the Supreme Court have cast their arguments
almost exclusively in originalist terms are revelatory in this respect.  A much
noted example comes from District of Columbia v. Heller,3 in which the major-
ity and principal dissenting opinions debated the scope of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms almost entirely on originalist grounds.4
Second, few originalists are exclusive originalists.  That is, very few
believe that evidence from the Founding era is the only consideration that
ought to matter to constitutional adjudication.5
2 See Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 657 (2013) (“Nonoriginalists and living constitutionalists tend to agree that adoption
history is very important.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
24–25 (2009) (“Not a single self-identifying non-originalist of whom I’m aware argues that
original meaning has no bearing on proper judicial constitutional interpretation.”); Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
487, 488 (1996) (“[M]ost views—my own included—assume that original understanding
and purposes are relevant to constitutional interpretation.  Differences emerge only over
how, and how weightily, these considerations enter the interpretive matrix.”); Peter J.
Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 722 (2011)
(“Notwithstanding the caricature of non-originalism that many originalists have offered,
most non-originalists—or at least most scholars or judges who do not readily identify as
originalists—believe that the original meaning is highly relevant and often dispositive.”
(footnotes omitted)); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (“Virtually everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the Fram-
ers count for something.”).
3 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4 See id. at 576–77 (relying on “[n]ormal meaning . . . [that would] have been known
to ordinary citizens in the founding generation” to find that the Second Amendment
includes an individual right to bear arms); id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on
the fact that “there is no indication that the Framers of the [Second] Amendment
intended to enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution” to find that
the Amendment contains no such individual right); id. at 683 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rely-
ing on colonial history not only to demonstrate that the Second Amendment does not
contain an individual right to bear arms, but also to demonstrate that, assuming the exis-
tence of such a right, the particular D.C. regulation would have been compatible with it);
see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 923, 924 (2009) (“Collectively, the opinions in Heller represent the most important
and extensive debate on the role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation
among the members of the contemporary Supreme Court.”).
5 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 413–14 (2012) (characterizing the doctrine of stare decisis as an exception to
the authors’ otherwise originalist philosophy); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert,
Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2, 9 (2011) (arguing that originalist
methods seek to discover an original conceptual meaning that must then be applied to
new facts and that correct applications cannot be determined by the Framers’ “unenacted
factual beliefs”).  An increasing number of originalists reach this conclusion by distinguish-
ing between original meaning, which is the object of constitutional “interpretation” but is
often vague or ambiguous, and constitutional “construction,” which requires further judg-
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Third, and most important, an obsession with debating the merits of a
frequently underdefined notion of originalism as opposed to an equally
underspecified conception of nonoriginalism distracts attention from the
wide varieties of historical inquiry that both originalists and nonoriginalists
recognize as relevant in constitutional decisionmaking.  When the debate
about originalism is temporarily put to one side, it emerges that the most
familiar foci of originalist concern—original intent, original understandings,
and original public meanings6—constitute just three of a myriad of historical
reference points that nearly everyone, originalists included, at least implicitly
accepts as mattering to constitutional law.  Moreover, when the multiple
dimensions of history’s pertinence are laid out, it becomes evident that even
when the original intent, understanding, or public meaning possesses agreed
determinative significance, that state of affairs is contingent, not necessary—
as widespread practice, including that of most self-described originalists,
attests.
My principal aim in this Article is to develop the third of these points,
involving the multiplicity of roles that history plays in constitutional analysis,
though I shall also say a few things in connection with the first two.  Much of
my effort will be taxonomic, aimed at mapping some of the kinds of histori-
cal inquiry in which participants in constitutional debate—including judges
and Justices—frequently, and mostly unselfconsciously, engage.  A systematic
rethinking of the roles of history in constitutional practice, beginning with an
effort at taxonomy, ought to cool the temperature of debates about original-
ism by revealing that nearly all originalists share a very broad swath of often
unacknowledged methodological common ground with nearly all
nonoriginalists.  In so saying, I do not claim that methodological overlap is
complete.  Indeed, partly because there has been so little specific attention to
the varied roles of nonoriginalist history in constitutional adjudication,7 I do
not expect full agreement either among originalists or among nonoriginalists
ment in rendering determinate what, as a matter of purely historical fact, was indetermi-
nate. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 2, at 646 (“[Original meaning] thus leaves most
important constitutional controversies in what Lawrence Solum calls the ‘construction
zone’ [in which] . . . the adopters only begin a transgenerational project of governance
that others must continue.”); Solum, supra note 1, at 483 (“Originalists may be tempted to
argue that the original meaning of the constitutional text provides an answer to every
constitutional question.  Once they understand the distinction between interpretation and
construction, originalists become open to the possibility that the linguistic meaning of the
constitutional text may sometimes underdetermine the outcome of constitutional cases.”).
6 On the differences among the meanings of these terms, see infra Section I.C.
7 I do not mean to suggest that issues of this kind have been wholly ignored.  A
recent, path-breaking work on general issues concerning nonoriginalist history in constitu-
tional adjudication is that of Balkin, supra note 2.  Important explorations of the nature
and value of specific kinds of nonoriginalist history include Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); Curtis
A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse
Possession, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2547962; and Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 575–77 (2003) (cataloguing points of disagreement).
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about how much weight specific kinds of historically grounded considera-
tions should exert in all cases.  But I do hope to spur further conversation
concerning the justifiability of reliance on particular kinds of history, includ-
ing nonoriginalist history, in particular kinds of cases, in which most original-
ists and most nonoriginalists could profitably engage with one another.  For
this purpose, the outlier positions—which are the only positions at which I
shall direct critical fire in this Article—are exclusive originalism, which holds
that nothing should matter except the best available evidence of Founding-
era meaning, and the view, if anyone actually holds it,8 that the present
should not submit to rule by “the dead hand of the past.”9
In developing the theses just sketched, I shall rely primarily, though not
exclusively, on illustrative examples drawn from federal courts law.  Among
the advantages of this focus, federal courts cases seldom present issues of
high political salience.  To the extent that ideological divisions exist, they
tend to be entangled in partly independent debates about the nature and
significance of constitutional federalism.10  Perhaps as a result, arguments in
and around federal courts cases have tended to exhibit less methodological
self-consciousness and defensiveness, and to elicit fewer line-in-the-sand
denunciations of either originalism or nonoriginalism, than debates in some
other areas of constitutional law.  In a search for common ground, the fed-
eral courts field therefore offers a promising place to start.11
8 Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 606, 615–16 (2008) (“No reputable interpretive method avoids the dead hand issue
because no reputable method disregards constitutional text.”).
9 Cf. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 225 (1980) (“Even if the adopters freely consented to the Constitution, . . . their
consent cannot bind succeeding generations.  We did not adopt the Constitution, and
those who did are dead and gone.” (footnote omitted)); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The
History of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459, 479
(1997) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996) (iden-
tifying threats posed by originalist constitutional theory as presenting “the classic ‘dead
hand’ problem: why should we, the living, be ruled by the dead hand of the past?”));
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1127 (1998) (“The first question any advocate of constitutionalism must answer is
why Americans of today should be bound by the decisions of people some 212 years ago.”).
10 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.  1141
(1988) (tracing the influence across a number of debates of competing Nationalist and
Federalist models of judicial federalism).
11 In an earlier article, I noted that for decades, if not for centuries, debates about
congressional power to define and limit the power of the federal courts had mostly
assumed the validity of originalist premises. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043 (2010).  Given the long-prevailing assumption that
originalist considerations controlled, I argued that the Supreme Court’s substantially
nonoriginalist analysis in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which posed a question
involving Congress’s capacity to withdraw federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, should pro-
voke new methodological self-consciousness within the corner of federal courts law that
involves jurisdiction-stripping.  This Article proceeds from a different organizing premise.
With regard to interpretive methodology, I shall assume—without trying to prove—that
analysis within the federal courts field reflects a familiar pattern in constitutional law.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-JUL-15 11:45
2015] the  roles  of  history  in  constitutional  adjudication 1757
In arguing that many kinds of history matter to constitutional adjudica-
tion, I partly follow in the footsteps of a recent, insightful article by Jack
Balkin,12 who also sought to identify varieties of historical argument that fig-
ure in constitutional debate.  Although I am much indebted to Balkin, my
analysis and conclusions diverge from his in as many respects as they overlap.
Balkin’s central theses focus on rhetoric and persuasion in the process of
what he calls constitutional “construction,” not interpretation.13  He eschews
claims concerning the legal obligations of judges and lawyers to weigh many
of the kinds of historically grounded considerations that he identifies.14  By
contrast, my argument involves the implicitly recognized duty of judges to
take account of a variety of sometimes contested historical phenomena in
order to render legally proper decisions.  Perhaps as a result, of the eleven
types of historical argument that Balkin identifies,15 as many as five have no
Paralleling pre-Boumediene debates about congressional control of federal jurisdiction,
some other pockets exist in which originalist assumptions dominate. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Heller).  In doctrinal areas of comparable if not larger significance, however, origi-
nal public meanings and the Framers’ intent constitute an afterthought, at most. See, e.g.,
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–34 (2010).
12 See Balkin, supra note 2.
13 Balkin posits a distinction between constitutional “meaning” and the processes of
constitutional “construction” by which judges give determinate content to vague or ambig-
uous meaning. See id. at 650.  Having done so, he focuses his analysis almost exclusively on
types of historical argument invoked in constitutional construction. See id. at 650–54.
14 See id. at 649–51.
15 Balkin’s highly original typology of historically based constitutional arguments
includes those that:
1. elucidate[ ] the meaning of the text (arguments from text);
2. reveal[ ] the structural logic underlying the constitutional system (arguments
from structure);
3. reveal[ ] the underlying purposes or principles behind the Constitution or
some part of the Constitution (arguments from purpose);
4. resolve[ ] gaps or ambiguities by choosing the interpretation that is the most
just or that otherwise has the best consequences (arguments from
consequences);
5. show[ ] how previous judicial precedents require a particular result (argu-
ments from precedent);
6. appeal[ ] to existing political settlements or conventions among political
actors (arguments from convention);
7. appeal[ ] to the people’s customs and lived experience (arguments from
custom);
8. appeal[ ] to natural law or natural rights (arguments from natural law);
9. appeal[ ] to important and widely honored values of Americans and Ameri-
can political culture (arguments from national ethos);
10. appeal[ ] to American political traditions and to the meaning of important
events in American cultural memory (arguments from political tradition); or
11. appeal[ ] to the values, beliefs, and examples of culture heroes in American
life (arguments from honored authority).
Id. at 660.
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counterparts in my catalogue, which also includes a number of entries of
which Balkin makes no mention.
Beyond documenting that a diverse set of historically based considera-
tions influences and sometimes governs constitutional adjudication, this Arti-
cle develops three main themes.  First, even when historical analysis focuses
on the Founding era, either the original public meaning of constitutional
language or the proper application of that meaning to particular cases fre-
quently cannot be identified as a matter of simple historical fact.  Although
there are many historical facts with a bearing on constitutional adjudication,
original public meanings and especially their proper applications often lie
outside the category of empirical fact.
Second, partly as a result, although historical analysis is empirically and
appropriately pervasive in constitutional adjudication, a blending of histori-
cal with normative analysis is also empirically and appropriately pervasive.
My argument for the evaluative aspect of these claims reflects an assumption,
which I shall defend, that American legal argument and adjudication consti-
tute a “practice,” the norms of which inhere in the often tacit understanding
of judges, lawyers, and others trained in law and legal argument concerning
how to “go on.”16  According to a practice-based theory, it is a mistake to
assume, as some do, that the ultimate determinant of legal validity necessarily
inheres in the commands of the Framers, the expectations of the Constitu-
tion’s ratifiers, or any other single historical phenomenon.  Rather, claims of
constitutional validity and authority depend on current agreement manifest
in the judgments of officials, judges, lawyers, and others concerning the con-
temporary legal significance of past events.  This agreement begins with foun-
dational matters.  We agree, for example, that the Constitution is valid law
and that the Articles of Confederation no longer are.  We also agree about
many matters bearing on legal interpretation, as I shall elaborate in complex
detail.  We accept, for example, that decisions of the Supreme Court have at
least some capacity to determine correct outcomes in future cases.  Insofar as
exclusive originalists maintain that events in the Founding era necessarily
determine what the law of the United States is or requires today, and deny
that the authority and meaning of the Constitution depend on widely shared,
often tacit norms of practice, they stand on faulty jurisprudential
foundations.
Third, despite the controlling significance of norms of practice, no sim-
ple, algorithmic formula dictates how pertinent kinds of history fit together
to yield determinate conclusions in many cases that provoke constitutional
controversy.  The best model for understanding how norms of practice oper-
ate in such cases is that of the common law.17  Although statements of con-
trolling interpretive norms are helpful, human foresight is limited, and
16 See infra Section III.B.
17 My argument may reflect a specific application of the broader portrayal of constitu-
tional adjudication as closely analogous to common law adjudication offered by STRAUSS,
supra note 10, at 33–49.
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history teaches that efforts at rule-like formulation of methodological princi-
ples should, accordingly, be viewed as revisable.
The argument develops as follows.  Part I presents the thesis that the
Supreme Court frequently undertakes a multiplicity of history-based inquiries
and weighs a variety of historically grounded considerations.  Part I also
argues (as some originalists recognize, but stringently exclusive originalists
do not) that the original meaning of constitutional language was frequently
vague or indeterminate.  Accordingly, the Constitution’s application to cur-
rent issues would often require a mix of historical and normative analysis
even if original history were the only kind of history that mattered.
Part II offers a preliminary exploration of why so many kinds of histori-
cal inquiry bear on constitutional and sometimes on statutory cases.18  Part
III advances a jurisprudential argument in favor of a multi-factored approach
to constitutional decisionmaking.  Arguing that the foundations of law,
including American constitutional practice, necessarily reside in social facts
involving what is accepted as binding law, Part III establishes the radical, revi-
sionary character of calls for exclusive originalism.
Part IV defends what—adapting vocabulary from Professor David
Strauss19—I call a common law approach to determining the relative impor-
tance of varied kinds of historical phenomena in reaching conclusions of
constitutional law.  It analyzes a mixture of “easy” and “hard” federal courts
cases to illustrate that almost no one, outside the context of a methodological
debate about how to resolve understandably disputable cases, actually is an
exclusive originalist, but that widespread convergence of judgment about the
proper decision of constitutional cases typically occurs anyway.  Part IV
explains calls for exclusive originalism as the product of a largely misplaced
anxiety about untrammeled judicial subjectivity.  Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
I. SOME VARIETIES OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PERTINENT HISTORY
The theses that history matters to constitutional law in a variety of ways,
and that historical analysis frequently is necessarily blended with normative
analysis, are best developed by example.  Some of the pertinent examples
track familiar categories, but others emerge from examinations of phenom-
ena that are not always distinguished.  My list of types of historical inquiry
that matter to constitutional analysis begins with considerations that original-
ists have emphasized and to which some assign a lexical priority.  As will
18 Originalism in constitutional interpretation and textualism in statutory interpreta-
tion share many premises and are often linked as elements of a single theory. See, e.g.,
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 33 (advocating an interpretive approach aimed at “deter-
mining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable
reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was
issued”).  Accordingly, nearly all of my arguments regarding the practice-based nature of
constitutional interpretation, and their implications for originalism, would apply in whole
or part to textualist theories of statutory interpretation.
19 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Editor’s Note to STRAUSS, supra note 11, at xiv.
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become evident, however, even nonoriginalists exhibit a concern with the
kinds of historical evidence that originalists put at the center of their theo-
ries, and even originalists widely assume the relevance of post-Founding his-
tory for a multitude of purposes.  In developing my list of historical
considerations pertinent to constitutional analysis, I proceed in rough chron-
ological order, beginning with the deeper past and then moving forward.
But my order of presentation implies no claims about relative significance to
contemporary analysis.
A. Linguistic and Cultural Antecedents to Constitutional Law
The Constitution of the United States is written in English, by English
speakers, for English speakers. It presupposes rules of English grammar and
syntax.  A common language and a common background for the discern-
ment of legally authoritative prescriptions constitute preconditions for the
intelligibility, and indeed for the existence, of the Constitution and argu-
ments surrounding it.
Some ridicule reliance on eighteenth-century dictionaries as a tool of
constitutional analysis.20  In my view, it would be more ridiculous to ignore
the meaning of words in the historical past than to seek to ascertain it.  Nev-
ertheless, dictionary-based inquiries should proceed with caution.21
Although dictionary definitions are indispensable in establishing what
philosophers of language call the original “semantic” meaning22 and lawyers
more often call the literal meaning23 of constitutional provisions, semantic
meaning is often vague or ambiguous, and in some instances it may even
misrepresent the communicative content of constitutional language.  To bor-
row a nonlegal example, an emergency ward doctor who tells a patient “you
are not going to die” does not communicate a prediction of eternal life, even
though that is indeed the semantic meaning of the sentence that she
speaks.24  In the constitutional context, a requirement that presidents be
“natural born” citizens does not preclude the election of someone whose
20 See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 483
(2013); Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 724 (2013).
21 See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding
Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014)
(providing guidelines for use, including cautions).
22 See, e.g., PATRICK GRIFFITHS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH SEMANTICS AND PRAGMAT-
ICS 21 (Heinz Giegerich ed., 2006) (“Semantics is the study of context-independent knowl-
edge that users of a language have of word and sentence meaning.”).
23 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 479, 487 (2013).
24 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 426
(2008).
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mother gave birth by Caesarian section, even though the semantic meaning
of Article II, § 1 leaves that possibility open.25
B. Legal Historical Contexts of Constitutional Lawmaking
Because meaning depends on context, in law as elsewhere, the history of
the drafting and ratification of constitutional provisions often has vital impor-
tance.  With regard to the federal courts canon, scholars have thus conducted
exhaustive research into the legal history and practice that likely either trig-
gered the drafting of particular provisions or informed understandings of
how relevant provisions would operate in practice.  To cite just a few well-
known examples, scholars have sought to establish history potentially rele-
vant to the meaning of the phrase “cases or controversies” in Article III;26 to
the scope and legal status of sovereign immunity in Britain and the American
colonies and to the purposes that drove the drafting of the Eleventh Amend-
ment;27 and to both British and American habeas corpus practice that
formed the background to the Constitution’s inclusion of the Suspension
Clause, which bars the writ’s suspension except in cases of invasion or
rebellion.28
It is important to be clear about the point of inquiries by lawyers and
judges into the historical context in which legal provisions were adopted.
Information establishing the context of the drafting and enactment of consti-
tutional language neither solely constitutes nor invariably identifies relevant
constitutional meaning.  Among other considerations, judgments need to be
made about which elements of historical context possess relevance for legal
purposes.  For example, British practice in allowing suits by parties who had
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be
eligible to the Office of President.”).
26 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819 (1969); Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative
Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1001–08 (1997); Louis L. Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1033 (1968); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doc-
trine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004).
27 Leading contributions to the literature include Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481–84 (1987); Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2010); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant
of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1058–59
(1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895–99 (1983); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh
Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1053–57 (2002);
and James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1998).
28 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 141 (1980);
PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010); Paul D. Halliday &
G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implica-
tions, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspen-
sion Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012).
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not themselves suffered injury from challenged conduct29 may or may not
bear on the best interpretation of Article III’s “case or controversy” require-
ment.30  To reach a conclusion, one would need to know a good deal more
about intended or widely anticipated continuities and discontinuities
between British and American practice and about historically prevailing con-
ceptions of the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers, which marked a
sharp break with British practice in some respects.31  Similarly, in light of
structural differences between the United States and Britain, it is not obvious
how much, if at all, British practice informed American understandings and
expectations regarding state sovereign immunity, or whether British practice
should be determinative in gauging the territorial scope of the Suspension
Clause.
C. Original Intentions or Purposes, Original Understandings,
and Original Public Meanings
Over time, constitutional originalists have altered their accounts of the
object of their historical inquiries.  First-generation originalists tended to
characterize the “intent of the Framers” as fixing constitutional meaning.32
An analogous but distinctive notion is that of the Framers’ purposes.  Other
originalists have sought evidence of “the original understanding.”33  Today,
most originalists maintain that “original public meaning” should furnish the
touchstone of constitutional analysis.34  In my view, all of these terms mark
29 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 26, at 827; Jaffe, supra note 26, at 1035.
30 Cf. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 26, at 691 (arguing that early historical prac-
tice, properly understood, neither “compels acceptance of the modern Supreme Court’s
vision of standing” nor does it “defeat standing doctrine”).
31 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 56 (2001).  Among other things, the U.S. Constitution established an independent judi-
ciary with the power of judicial review, see id. at 56 n.228, rejected the British principle of
parliamentary sovereignty, see id., and created an executive branch headed by a president
whose powers did not encompass all elements of the British monarch’s “royal preroga-
tives.” See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 859–60
(1989).
32 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 403 (2d ed. 1997); Edwin Meese
III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE
GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 1 (1986); Robert H. Bork,
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986);
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objec-
tions and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 228 (1988).
33 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots and Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Case of
the Ninth Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 467–68 (2008); John C. Yoo, The
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1374 (1997); see also Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 716–19 (1999) (examining evidence of the “original understanding” of the
Constitution’s ratifiers).
34 See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitu-
tion’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003); Solum, supra note 23, at 498;
Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377, 380
(2013).
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appropriate objects of historical investigation—as I believe that widespread
and frequently uncontroversial constitutional practice indicates.  Nonethe-
less, they differ importantly from one another.
1. Intent of the Framers
In nearly all contexts, the identifiable intentions or purposes of a
speaker function as an important indicator of the meaning of the speaker’s
utterances.35  To be clear, speakers’ intentions do not always constitute the
meaning of what they say.  People can either fail to say what they mean or say
things that they do not mean.  Nevertheless, a speaker’s intent is often cru-
cially relevant to what ordinary people understand a speaker to have commu-
nicated in ordinary conversation.36
Although it is now well known that problems attend the ascription of
unitary intents to the multimember bodies that enact legislation or draft or
ratify constitutional provisions,37 the idea of legislative or the Framers’ intent
is complex and ambiguous in multiple ways.38  Different authors use it to
refer, variously, to the psychological expectations of individual legislators
concerning the application of laws for which they voted (as illumined, for
example, by legislative history),39 the “illocutionary” intent of the members
of the legislature to say what a statute says,40 and a complex or collective
group intention to effect reasonable changes in the law through statutory or
constitutional language.41  As this brief catalogue might suggest, the notion
of intent is difficult entirely to dispense with in ascribing meaning to lan-
guage adopted by rational beings with an evident aim—whether individually
or collectively—of communicating.  Even textualists who deride the idea that
legislators or constitution drafters share a single or even dominant psycholog-
ical intention thus say that their interpretive methodology requires the
35 See, e.g., PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 117 (1989) (characterizing the
utterer’s meaning as “basic” and other notions of meaning as “(I hope) derivative”).
36 Even those philosophers of language who do not equate the meaning of an utter-
ance with the speaker’s intent typically regard the speaker’s intention as relevant to utter-
ance meaning. See, e.g., Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 598 (2013).
37 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
428–31 (2005); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244 (1992).
38 See generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 13, 15–47, 218–43
(2012) (distinguishing various conceptions of legislative intent and defending as central
the intention to change the law in the complex, reasoned way that a statute or constitu-
tional provision does).
39 See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1335–60 (1990).
40 See, e.g., Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
231, 244 (2011).  This seems to be so minimal a conception of legislative intent as to be
unobjectionable even to textualists. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 37, at 431 (denying that
legislatures have a collective intent beyond the text that they enact).
41 See EKINS, supra note 38, at 218–43.
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ascription of an “objective intent” to statutory or constitutional provisions
and to those who enacted, drafted, or ratified them.42
Nonoriginalists, too, exhibit at least a sometime concern with the intent
of the Framers.  For example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning,43 in which an opin-
ion concurring only in the judgment argued that the original public mean-
ing of the Recess Appointments Clause44 permitted the President to fill only
such vacancies as might arise for the first time between sessions of Con-
gress,45 Justice Breyer, who wrote for the majority, defended his broader
interpretation—encompassing intra-session recesses—with claims about what
the Founders likely “intend[ed].”46  In an earlier majority opinion in Federal
Election Commission v. Akins, Justice Breyer had similarly suggested the perti-
nence to a standing question of “whether ‘the Framers . . . ever imagined that
general directives [of the Constitution] . . . would be subject to enforcement by
an individual citizen’” in the absence of a statutory authorization to sue.47
2. The Framers’ Purposes
Even those who recurrently reject claims that legislatures can have inten-
tions analogous to those of individuals attach interpretive significance to the
widely shared purposes that motivated the adoption of constitutional lan-
guage.48  Debates about the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment exemplify
the point.  Amid a welter of disagreements about other matters, nearly every-
one seems to agree that the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment turns on
the purposes of those who drafted and ratified it.  Although the Eleventh
Amendment makes no explicit reference to state sovereign immunity,49 it
was indisputably drafted and ratified to overrule a Supreme Court decision
that rejected a state’s immunity defense against a suit in federal court,
brought by a citizen of one state against another state pursuant to federal
42 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (“We look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”);
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79
(2006); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353–57 (2005) (discussing
textualists’ search for statutes’ “objectified intent”).
43 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 empowers the President to “fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”
45 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
46 See id. at 2564–65 (majority opinion).
47 524 U.S. 11, 22 (1998) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974)).
48 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 33; Solum, supra note 23, at 500.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).  The suit in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1980), involved a suit against the State
of Louisiana brought by a citizen of Louisiana.
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diversity jurisdiction.50  Canvassing that history, the Supreme Court in Hans
v. Louisiana,51 relied on the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment’s Framers
to hold that it barred an unconsented suit against a state, brought by one of
its own citizens, to which the literal terms of the Amendment did not
extend.52  That purpose, the Court held, was to adopt the view of “the minor-
ity [rather] than . . . [of] the majority of the [C]ourt in the decision of the
case of Chisholm v. Georgia.”53
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,54 the Court again emphasized the
pertinence of the purpose with which a constitutional provision is drafted
and ratified when it affirmed that analysis based on the literal language “of
the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man.”55  According to Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, “we long have recognized that blind
reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is ‘to strain the Constitu-
tion and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.’”56  So
reasoning, the majority echoed Hans in ascribing to the Eleventh Amend-
ment the specific purpose of overruling Chisholm v. Georgia and of implicitly
endorsing what the Court took to be the original public meaning of Article
III: “Hans . . . recognized that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the
well-understood meaning of the Constitution.”57  Although indeed relying
on the language of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissenting opinions felt as
much obligation as the majority to identify purposes in connection with
which their alternative interpretations made practical sense.  Justice Souter
thus wrote that, in light of “the Framers’ general concern with curbing
abuses by state governments, it would be amazing if the scheme of delegated
powers embodied in the Constitution had left the National Government pow-
erless to render the States judicially accountable for violations of federal
rights.”58
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.59 exhibits a similar concern with a constitu-
tional provision’s purposes. Plaut posed the question whether Congress
could validly nullify a final judicial judgment.  In answering that question in
the negative, the Supreme Court relied on the purposes for which leading
members of the Founding generation had supported an independent judici-
ary.  According to Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, the Framers, who had
“lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial
powers,”60 wished to insulate final judicial judgments from legislative revi-
50 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
51 134 U.S. 1.
52 See id. at 12.
53 Id.
54 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
55 Id. at 69.
56 Id. (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934)).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 155 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
60 Id. at 219.
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sion.61  That identifiable purpose bore on, even if it did not strictly deter-
mine, the appropriate interpretation of Article III’s grant of judicial power.62
Although reliance on the Framers’ purposes triggers no methodological
objection in some cases, it has proven controversial in others, largely because
of a well-known problem about levels of generality: the more abstract the
terms in which a purpose is described, the more broadly it is likely to reach.63
To put the point in vocabulary that I shall echo going forward, although
many historical facts bear on the question of a constitutional provision’s pur-
pose, there is often no simple, historical fact of the matter concerning what
that purpose was or how it ought to be described once self-consciousness
about the proper level of generality enters the picture.  In general, the
broader the consensus about the level of generality pertinent to a particular
disputed issue, the less controversial an inquiry into the purposes of the draft-
ers and ratifiers of a constitutional provision is likely to be (even if, as in the
cases of the Eleventh Amendment, different investigators reach different
conclusions).  The central point is that nearly everyone regards such inquir-
ies as appropriate in some cases.
3. Original Understanding
Although lawyers and judges speak nearly ubiquitously of “constitutional
interpretation,” this term contains an often ignored ambiguity.  In one usage,
interpretation applies to all ascriptions of meaning to, and to all applications
of, legal language.64  In another sense, interpretation is an intellectual activ-
61 See id. at 221 (“This sense of a sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the
judicial power, prompted by the crescendo of legislative interference with private judg-
ments of the courts, triumphed among the Framers of the new Federal Constitution.”).
62 See id. at 218–19 (“The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter
of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judici-
ary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by
superior courts in the Article III hierarchy . . . . By retroactively commanding the federal
courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this fundamental principle.”).
63 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2010 (2009) (“Purposivists . . . are willing to shift the level
of generality at which a statute’s policy or purpose is articulated in order to achieve
rational results that they presume the legislature would have wanted if it had focused on
the issues before the Court.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (arguing that when the Court
seeks to determine whether an “asserted [constitutional] right” falls within the protection
of a previously articulated right, “[t]he more abstractly one states the already-protected
right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protection”); cf.
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 7 (1996) (“There is of course room for disagreement
about the right way to restate these abstract moral principles, so as to make their force
clearer for us, and to help us to apply them to more concrete political controversies.”).
64 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 207 (1991) (observing that “every
application of a rule is also an interpretation”).
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ity that responds to uncertainty or puzzlement.65  Distinction between these
two senses of interpretation, and between the kinds of cases that do and do
not trigger puzzlement, suggests the utility of a somewhat specialized mean-
ing—which I shall stipulatively adopt—for references to “the original under-
standing.”  More specifically, I shall reserve the term “original
understanding” for cases in which, as an original matter, the meaning or
application of a constitutional provision would have produced little or no
uncertainty or puzzlement and no intellectually sophisticated process of
interpretation would even have been required.  In such cases, it would be apt
to say, members of the Founding generation simply and nearly universally
understood what the Constitution meant without needing to “interpret” it.66
Historical evidence indicates that some members of the Founding gener-
ation distinguished “understanding” from “interpretation” in the way that I
am suggesting: there was no need for interpretation in clear cases in which
everyone understood or should have understood what the Constitution
meant.67  But I do not mean to hinge my claim for the utility of that distinc-
tion on a claim of historical fact.  An intuitive distinction exists—even if it
blurs at the edges—between cases of clear meaning that is readily and almost
universally grasped or understood and puzzling or disputable cases that pro-
voke a need for reflection or interpretation.
Cases that provoke puzzlement, uncertainty, or disagreement under-
standably dominate the standard federal courts curriculum as they do consti-
tutional law casebooks.  If we take a broader lens view of the legal landscape,
however, cases of puzzlement or uncertainty—and the kind of analysis that
they call for—stand out as anomalous.  So far as I am aware, for example, no
one has ever disputed that Article I requires the agreement of both houses of
Congress in order for a bill to become law or—with respect to the application
of Article I—that the 1789 Judiciary Act was enacted in accordance with Arti-
cle I.  In this case and in many others, we can say, as a matter of historical
fact, that the original understanding of Article I requires both houses to act
for a bill to become law or that the 1789 Judiciary Act was validly enacted
within the original understanding of Article I.  We could not say the same,
however, with respect to some other questions, many of which we know to
have been matters of historical uncertainty, puzzlement, or debate.
So far as I am aware, no one disparages the relevance to constitutional
law of historical research aimed at establishing whether there was or was not
65 See ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 108 (2014); SCHAUER, supra note 64, at
207–08 (recognizing that “we ordinarily do not think” of most applications as interpreta-
tions “for there is a sense in which to interpret a text or a rule is to deal with a quandary”).
66 See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 22 (1992); DENNIS PATTER-
SON, LAW AND TRUTH 86–88 (1996).
67 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (identifying a
Founding-era conception of judicial review under which “courts and commentators of the
time apparently thought it proper to invalidate legislation on constitutional grounds only
in cases of such relatively clear legislative or executive overreaching that little or no ‘inter-
pretation’ was required”).
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a clear original understanding—existing as a matter of historical fact—of
what particular constitutional provisions meant or how they applied or would
have applied to particular cases.  So to recognize is not necessarily to stipu-
late that original understandings, where they exist, should always control con-
stitutional outcomes.  Even if everyone in the Founding era understood the
death penalty to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment,68 some would maintain that the
“meaning” of the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment today—
and may, indeed, have forbidden it then.69
4. The Original Public Meaning
Today, most originalists describe the ultimate object of original histori-
cal inquiry by judges and lawyers as “the original public meaning” of constitu-
tional language.70  As standardly employed, this term not only subsumes what
I just characterized as the original understanding in doubt-free cases, but also
extends more broadly, to encompass judgments concerning the meaning of
constitutional provisions even when the historical record discloses either
grounds for or evidence of uncertainty or disagreement.  Reference to some
known cases of original disagreement may help to clarify the sometime need
for interpretive judgment—in the special, puzzlement-resolving sense of that
term that I emphasized above—in identifying or at least in applying the origi-
nal public meaning.71
• Members of the Framing generation notoriously disagreed about
whether one or more provisions of Article I of the Constitution
authorized Congress to charter a Bank of the United States.72  When
an uncertain President George Washington asked the advice of Secre-
tary of State Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton, Jeffer-
son said no, but Hamilton answered affirmatively.73
• In a matter of potential significance for the federal courts curriculum,
we know that a lame-duck Federalist Congress expanded the size of
the federal judiciary in 1801, but also that a Republican Congress
almost immediately repealed the 1801 Judiciary Act and divested six-
teen recently nominated and confirmed federal judges of their judge-
ships.74  The debate about the repealing legislation registered
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69 See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86
GEO. L.J. 569, 603–13 (1998).
70 See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 34, at 1132; Solum, supra note 23, at 498.
71 As the historian Jack Rakove has written, the “moment” of framing and ratification
“involved processes of collective decision-making whose outcomes necessarily reflected a
bewildering array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises
and agreements to disagree.” JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 6 (1996).
72 See Joseph M. Lynch, The Federalists and the Federalist: A Forgotten History, 31 SETON
HALL L. REV. 18, 21–23 (2000).
73 See id.
74 See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 163–68 (2002).
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disagreement among the Founding generation about whether Article
III’s guarantee of tenure during “good behavior” applied to cases
involving the abolition of judgeships for economy reasons (rather
than the removal of particular judges due to disapproval of their deci-
sions in office).75
• Debates during the state ratifying conventions revealed disagreement
whether Article III’s authorization of federal jurisdiction of suits
involving a state and a citizen of another state divested the states of the
sovereign immunity that they would have claimed in their own
courts.76  A majority of the Justices answered in the affirmative in
Chisholm v. Georgia,77 but Justice Iredell dissented.78
• Early jurists disagreed about whether the provision of Article III
authorizing the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction of
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
encompassed review of state court judgments.79
• Disagreement persisted until after the Civil War about whether the
Constitution permits state court judges to issue writs of habeas corpus
commanding action by federal officials.80
Cases of interpretive disagreement or uncertainty such as these are cru-
cial in appraising the various roles that historical inquiries play in constitu-
tional adjudication.  In such cases, we cannot say as a simple matter of
historical fact that the disputed language had an original public meaning
that was sufficiently determinate to resolve a disputed question of constitu-
tional interpretation one way or the other.  The historical facts establish disa-
greement, not agreement, about meaning or at least about proper
constitutional application.  So to recognize is by no means to suggest that
history is irrelevant to the decision of historically disputed or disputable ques-
tions.  To the contrary, many historical facts may have some bearing.  We can,
for example, discover what dictionaries said about the meaning of disputed
terms.  We can unearth potentially relevant background legal history.  We
can ascertain what particular people said or thought.  But these historical
facts will not suffice to give relevantly determinate content to the idea of
“original public meaning” without some further judgment about how and
why, for example, Hamilton was right and Jefferson was wrong—or vice
versa—about whether Article I empowered Congress to charter a Bank of the
United States.  To put the point another way, there is no simple historical
75 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 53–54 (2009).
76 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History,
81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2002) (surveying these debates in both the conventions and the
popular press).
77 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
78 See id. at 429, 449–50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
79 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 434–45 (discussing state court resistance to
Supreme Court review).
80 See id. at 398–403.
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fact of the matter about whether a Bank of the United States was constitu-
tionally permissible.  The question is one that requires the exercise of inter-
pretive judgment in light of relevant historical facts.  We might, for example,
adjudge Hamilton’s arguments more persuasive than Jefferson’s (or vice
versa).  But, due to the vagueness or indeterminacy of language, there will
always be a gap between knowable empirical facts and appropriate conclu-
sions regarding the application of constitutional language to particular, dis-
puted or reasonably disputable cases.
Cases of original vagueness or indeterminacy, as starkly illuminated by
historical examples of interpretive disagreement, pose significant method-
ological issues for anyone who thinks that original meanings possess rele-
vance to constitutional adjudication.  But the issue possesses special urgency
for originalists.  Confronted with a need for methodological choice, some
accept that the original meaning of a constitutional provision can be vague
or indeterminate and, when this is so, postulate that judges must engage in
“construction,” involving the creation of doctrine to answer questions that
the Constitution’s meaning leaves unresolved.81  On this account, finding the
original meaning of constitutional language is the first step in resolving con-
stitutional controversies, but it will often leave such controversies unresolved.
As in the modern case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.,82 some institution must render determinate what legal language
leaves indeterminate, and the courts are an obviously eligible candidate.
Where courts play this role, the disciplines that attend “construction”—which
is an irreducibly value-laden enterprise—become crucially relevant.
According to Jack Balkin, who emphasizes the distinction between con-
stitutional meaning and constitutional construction, originalists can and
should recognize the relevance of a variety of kinds of post-Founding history
to questions of constitutional construction.83  He accepts, however, that the
meaning of constitutional provisions became fixed at the time of their
ratification.84
Other originalists reject the idea that the Constitution requires construc-
tion in the sense of judicial creation of doctrine that goes beyond constitu-
tional meaning.85  In their view, a provision’s original public meaning is
81 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 100–09 (2004);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5–14 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Con-
struction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 65 (2011) (arguing the merits of keeping construc-
tion separate from interpretation); Solum, supra note 1, at 457 (focusing on the role of the
“interpretation-construction distinction” in New Originalism); Whittington, supra note 34,
at 403.
82 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
83 See Balkin, supra note 2, at 650–55.
84 Id. at 645–46.
85 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 15; John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Origi-
nal Methods Originalism]. But see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract
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determinable in every case, and, what is more, meaning, once ascertained,
will always dictate the correct results of constitutional cases.  Sophisticated
adherents of this position do not, as I understand them, maintain that any
simple empirical fact of the matter supplies vague or disputed provisions with
the determinate content needed to resolve uncertain or disputed cases.
Rather, to render determinate what otherwise would be indeterminate,
originalists of this stripe often say that a judgment concerning the original
public meaning should reflect what a “reasonable” person in the eighteenth
or early nineteenth century would have thought.86  In other words, in order
to resolve any particular case, judges should apply constitutional language as
a reasonable person of the Founding era would have applied it.
As the historian Jack Rakove emphasizes, however, “[a]n imaginary
originalist reader who never existed historically can never be a figure from
the past; the reader remains only a fabrication of a modern mind.”87  Moreo-
ver, if reasonable people differed as a matter of historical fact—as in the
examples that I have given—then we would need to determine what it would
have been “most reasonable” to think.  When Thomas Jefferson and Alexan-
der Hamilton, or James Madison and John Jay, articulately disagreed with
one another, the “right” answer to a disputed question of original public
meaning cannot depend on a statistical calculation of how many of the pub-
lic likely agreed with one and how many with the other.  Rather, determining
how an imagined reasonable person would have resolved a dispute among
reasonable people requires a further evaluative judgment.88  Once more, the
modern example of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 752 n.54 (2012) (“It is theoretically possible that
the interpretive rules may not resolve every uncertainty, especially uncertainty resulting
from vagueness. . . . [T]hen one might be in a situation involving construction, where the
original meaning does not provide an answer.”).
86 See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 34, at 1132–33, 1144–55; Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006).
87 Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Mean-
ing Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 586 (2011).
88 See, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323,
391 (2012) (maintaining that “a positive definition of reasonableness is a logical impossibil-
ity” because “no positive definition can satisfy” all of the axioms that a positive definition
would need to embrace). McGinnis and Rappaport seek to respond to the problem of
historical indeterminacy by proposing that modern interpreters should apply the interpre-
tive methods that reasonable, well-informed judges and lawyers would have employed to
gauge the meaning of a constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.  McGinnis &
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 85, at 751.  But this move only
postpones, without avoiding, the need for normative judgment if—as a number of scholars
have concluded—reasonable members of the Founding generation differed among them-
selves about applicable norms of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note
20, at 736 (“McGinnis and Rappaport . . . treat Founding-era legal culture in an anachro-
nistic manner and assume the existence of a consensus on issues that were actually deeply
contested in 1788.”); Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New
Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 304 (2014) (maintaining that “interpre-
tation during the founding era and subsequent decades was eclectic”).
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Inc.89 proves instructive.  It inscribes in law the common sense recognition
that vague or ambiguous legal language will often bear more than one rea-
sonable interpretation and that reasonable people will disagree in their judg-
ments concerning how it applies to particular cases.
The Founding generation’s disputes among reasonable people about
the meaning of constitutional language are importantly instructive for
another reason as well.  Many of their disputes were ideologically inflected.90
In cases of ambiguity or uncertainty, American lawyers and Justices at least
since John Marshall have gravitated toward the candidate to furnish the cor-
rect legal meaning that would render legal texts wisest, best, or most sensi-
ble.91  As Chief Justice Marshall put it in McCulloch v. Maryland,92 “general
reasoning” refutes the proposition that, given a choice, a court should adopt
an interpretation of the Constitution that would render the achievement of
its largest purposes “difficult, hazardous, and expensive.”93  Accordingly, it
should occasion no surprise that in disputes about the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions, even the most venerated statesmen frequently fell into ideo-
logically identifiable alignments—as, for example, in debates about whether
Article I authorized Congress to charter a Bank of the United States or
whether Article III forbade abolition of the judgeships created by the 1801
Judiciary Act.94
The point is worth belaboring because in many disputed cases focused
on questions about the original public meaning, evidence plain on the face
of the historical record indicates the existence of grounds for uncertainty or
controversy.  In these cases, historical evidence is relevant, but it cannot fur-
nish a full answer to the legal question that a court must resolve.95
89 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
90 See John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 474 (2008) (observing that among the Founding generation,
“interpreters’ positions on constitutional questions overwhelmingly lined up with what they
thought were good ideas”).  Professor Harrison reports drawing this conclusion based
upon his reading of DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 116–22 (1997).
91 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 645–46
(1999) (arguing that, when the original meaning of a text, “[d]ue to either ambiguity or
generality,” is “underdeterminate,” that text “should be given the meaning that is most
respectful of the rights of all who are affected and rules of construction most respectful of
these rights should be adopted to put general constitutional provisions into legal effect”).
92 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
93 Id. at 408, 411.
94 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 75, at 53–54; SIMON, supra note 74, at 163–67.
95 See Rakove, supra note 87, at 593 (“The adopters of the Constitution inhabited a
world that was actively concerned with the nature of language . . . [and] the instability of
linguistic meanings, and . . . arguments about the definitions of key words and concepts
were themselves central elements of political debate.”).
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D. Liquidation Through Practice
Recognizing that the Constitution was vague or ambiguous on many
important points, James Madison maintained that its meaning would need to
be “liquidated” or settled by precedent and practice.96  Today we often
equate precedent exclusively with judicial precedent.  But the term reaches
more broadly.  As Madison foresaw, historical evidence of settlement through
nonjudicial practice sometimes figures importantly in constitutional law.
Here are a few examples:
• Article II provides for the President to make treaties and appoint vari-
ous officers “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”97  In
an early instance, President George Washington appeared before the
Senate to seek its advice in person, but the occasion went badly, and
Washington never repeated the exercise.98  The practice of Washing-
ton and subsequent presidents, as acquiesced in by the Senate, has
established that the President need not come before the Senate in
order to act with the Senate’s advice.99
• The First Judiciary Act and a number of its successors required the
Justices of the Supreme Court to “ride circuit” and thereby act, in
effect, as lower court judges during periods when the Court was not in
session.100  Some members of the Founding generation thought that
the requirement of circuit riding breached Article III by failing to
respect its distinction between judges of the Supreme and of the infer-
ior courts.101  When the Supreme Court finally had occasion to pro-
nounce on that question in 1803, it ruled that “practice and
acquiescence under it” had settled the constitutional issue.102
• In 1793, with European powers at war, Secretary of State Thomas Jef-
ferson, acting on behalf of President George Washington, wrote to the
Justices of the Supreme Court, soliciting their “advice” concerning the
various parties’ legal rights of access to American ports.103  In
response, Chief Justice John Jay and the associate Justices wrote to the
President citing separation-of-powers grounds for refusing to proffer
the requested advice.104  Although the Justices’ letter was not techni-
cally an opinion of the Court with stare decisis effect, The Correspon-
dence of the Justices is almost universally regarded as having liquidated
96 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229–30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
97 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
98 See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 89 (2009).
99 See Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 257–60
(2012) (describing the evolution of the practice of “subsequent” advice-giving).
100 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.
101 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 163–76 (2005).
102 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
103 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 50–51.
104 See id. at 52.
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the meaning of Article III as flatly forbidding the federal judiciary
from issuing advisory opinions.105
• In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,106
the Supreme Court treated the practice of early Congresses in author-
izing qui tam actions—in which private citizens sue on behalf of the
government to recover on false claims against the government—as
having settled the permissibility of such suits under Article III, despite
the absence of a prior, on-point judicial decision upholding the
authorization.107
Although practically no one doubts that historical practice has settled
constitutional meaning in these and some other cases, the idea of “liquida-
tion” through practice—despite its Madisonian provenance—remains
obscure in some respects.108  Debated questions include these109: (1) Is the
capacity to “liquidate” or settle meaning limited to practices that began
closely proximately in time to the Constitution’s adoption, or can liquidation
occur through later practice?  If original meanings are regarded as authorita-
tive in all cases, and if liquidation refers to the resolution of originally per-
ceived indeterminacies within an originally identifiable range of permissible
meanings,110 then one might think the former.  Alternatively, one might use
the term “liquidation” to refer to any form of settlement through historical
practice.  (2) Once practice has “liquidated” the meaning of a constitutional
term, does the meaning as thus liquidated become fixed forever, or can
evolving practice endow vague or ambiguous terms with historically changing
meanings?  In the leading historical study, Professor Caleb Nelson suggests
that the former understanding enjoyed broad currency in the Founding gen-
eration,111 but he also acknowledges that then-prevailing views on this point
do not necessarily hold authoritative significance today.112  (3) Must
105 See id. at 52–54.  My references to The Correspondence of the Justices encompass the
compilation of sources found in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67; see id. at 50 n.4 (citing 3
THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, 1782–1793, at 486–89 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1891) and 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON 111 n.1 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969)).
106 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
107 See id. at 774 (“We are confirmed in this conclusion by the long tradition of qui tam
actions in England and the American Colonies.”).
108 For a path-breaking historical and analytical study, see Nelson, supra note 7, at 552
n.137.
109 I am grateful to Curt Bradley for pressing these questions in commenting on an
earlier draft.
110 According to Nelson, supra note 7, at 536–38, James Madison reflected a predomi-
nant current of legal thinking in the Founding generation in believing that legal meaning
was necessarily original meaning that, following the passage of time, could only be settled
through retrospective inquiries.
111 See id. at 527.
112 See id. at 552–53 (“[I]f an instruction to follow settled liquidations is not itself part
of the Constitution’s ‘meaning,’ then present-day originalists are free to consider alterna-
tive approaches to the Constitution’s indeterminacies.”).
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thoughtful deliberation of constitutional validity occur in order for legislative
or executive practice to constitute a binding liquidation?  Madison, for exam-
ple, thought that some early congressional precedents settled constitutional
meaning, but that others, because they “were passed with little deliberation,”
did not.113  This view would obviously give rise to further debates about the
authority of many particular actions and practices.
Overall, perhaps the safest conclusion is that all agree that historical
inquiries are necessary and appropriate to determine whether historical prac-
tice has “liquidated” the meaning of otherwise vague or ambiguous constitu-
tional provisions,114 and if so how, but that a number of questions about the
nature and conditions of liquidation remain unsettled.
E. Historical “Gloss”
Closely related to the idea of settlement of constitutional meaning
through liquidation, but possibly more capacious, is that of longstanding and
seldom questioned practice as a “gloss” on constitutional meaning.115  The
canonical citation for the authority of historical gloss comes from Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,116
in which he maintained that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, . . .
may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by . . .
Art. II.”117
113 Id. at 527.
114 For other historical examples, see, e.g., Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576
(1926) (holding that uncontested petitions for naturalization satisfy the case or contro-
versy requirement because “[t]he function of admitting to citizenship has been conferred
exclusively upon courts continuously since the foundation of our Government” and “[t]he
constitutionality of this exercise of jurisdiction has never been questioned”); The Laura,
114 U.S. 411, 416 (1885) (“[T]he practice [under federal legislation] and acquiescence
under it, ‘commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.’” (quoting Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 299, 309 (1803))).
115 For analysis of the frequently unanalyzed notion of historical gloss, see Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 7, at 417–24.
116 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
117 Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  For arguable examples of the Supreme
Court’s acceptance of historical practice as constituting a gloss on constitutional meaning,
see for example Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (affirming a presi-
dential  power to suspend pending legal claims based on “the fact that the practice goes
back over 200 years, and has received congressional acquiescence throughout its history”);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (finding that the President had the
power to suspend claims in American courts against Iran in part on the basis of “a history
of [congressional] acquiescence”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 327–28 (1936) (relying on historical practice to find that Congress could constitution-
ally delegate to the President the power to criminalize arms sales to countries involved in a
conflict in Latin America); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (relying in part
on “[l]ong settled and established practice” to find that a bill presented to the President
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Depending on how the concept of “liquidation” is construed, the idea of
historical practice constituting a “gloss” on constitutional language may call
for somewhat broader ranging historical inquiries.  For example, nothing
inherent in the notion of “gloss,” as Justice Frankfurter described it, restricts
the glossing power to the Framing generation,118 nor limits settlement
through practice to a range of meanings that was originally contemplated
and regarded as permissible.  In NLRB v. Noel Canning, for example, Justice
Breyer’s majority opinion asserted that “[the] Court has treated practice as
an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the
founding era.”119
Speaking to one of the most important questions surrounding the
notion of historical gloss, Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment
in Noel Canning maintained that practice can settle constitutional meaning
only when the original public meaning was ambiguous.120  Although the
majority did not expressly disagree, this asserted limitation can prove elusive
for at least two reasons.  First, ambiguity (or vagueness) comes in degrees.  In
the Noel Canning case, for example, one of the disputed issues involved
whether the President’s power to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen dur-
ing the Recess of the Senate”121 extended to vacancies that predated a
recess’s commencement.  Justice Scalia thought unambiguously not.122  By
contrast, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion reasoned that even if “the most
natural meaning” of the word “happen” would limit the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause to vacancies that developed while the Senate was out of session,
this was not “the only possible way to use the word,” since “happen” can also
mean “exist.”123  However one judges that analysis, no sharp line may mark
the point at which a sufficient degree of ambiguity exists to license glossing
by practice.
Second, and perhaps more important, practice and precedent can help
to shape perceptions of when constitutional language is or is not relevantly
fewer than ten days before an inter-session recess that the President neither signs nor
returns does not become a law); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401
(1819) (“[A] doubtful question . . . in the decision of which . . . the respective powers of
those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted . . . ought to
receive a considerable impression from [the practice of the Government].”). See generally
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 7, at 417–24 (examining the prevalence of the historical
gloss argument in connection with debates over the scope of presidential power).
118 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 7, at 2 (distinguishing a “liquidation” approach
from a “historical gloss” approach).
119 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
120 See id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“What the majority needs to
sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.  What it has is a
clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice.”).
121 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
122 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
123 Id. at 2567.
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vague or ambiguous.124  In Noel Canning, for instance, “the majority’s deci-
sion to regard the text as ambiguous seems itself to have been affected by its
understanding of the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, historical
practice, and the consequences of an alternative interpretation.”125  As Jus-
tice Breyer put it, the Court was hesitant to “render illegitimate thousands of
recess appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”126
Although the majority’s analysis provoked controversy in Noel Canning, in
part because of the majority’s labored efforts to establish ambiguity where
the dissenting Justices saw none,127 the phenomenon of what Professors
Bradley and Siegel call “constructed constraint”128—in which practical con-
siderations influence the perception and not merely the resolution of ambi-
guity—is widespread in constitutional law, with prior interpretations
frequently affecting appraisals of the meanings best ascribed to constitutional
language.129  To cite just one particularly clear example, historical practice
and precedent seem crucial to the currently uncontroversial construal of the
First Amendment—which provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech”130—as precluding abridgments of free
speech by the federal executive and judicial branches.
As an empirical matter, the Supreme Court has most frequently credited
the argument that longstanding historical practice can put a gloss on consti-
tutional meaning in matters involving the separation of powers.131  But it has
pursued similar analyses in other contexts.  For example, the Burger Court
relied on historical practice as settling the constitutionality of federal and
state tax exemptions to religious institutions.132
124 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 7, at 38.
125 Id.
126 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
127 See id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the relevant
constitutional text as “clear”).
128 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 7, at 3.
129 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1252–54 (1987) (describing how nontextual factors guide
ascriptions of meaning to constitutional language).
130 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
131 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 7, at 417 (“[A]rguments based on historical
practice are common in controversies relating to the separation of powers.”); Jane E.
Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE
L.J. 845, 876 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) (“[W]here
the constitutional text is genuinely ambiguous or silent, as it is regarding issues such [as]
the President’s power as Commander in Chief to deploy forces abroad for foreign policy
purposes in peacetime or the precise scope of the President’s authority to ‘repel sudden
attacks,’ longstanding and consistent historical practice can shed light on how we should
understand the President’s constitutional power today.”).
132 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“It is obviously correct that no
one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even
when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.  Yet an
unbroken practice of according [this tax] exemption to churches, openly and by affirma-
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The Supreme Court has not always treated even long-established prac-
tices as immune from constitutional invalidation, either in separation of pow-
ers cases,133 under the First Amendment,134 or in other contexts.135  Nor, to
repeat, is the line between “liquidation” through precedent and “glossing” by
practice a clear one—even when it is widely agreed that historical practice
has settled some matter decisively.  For example, all of the current Justices
seem to agree that early congressional practice in hiring a chaplain estab-
lishes that prayers at the beginning of congressional sessions do not violate
the Establishment Clause,136 even though they may disagree about exactly
why this practice has the significance that it does, and even though they
divide sharply about whether and if so how far early congressional practice
with regard to chaplains bears on the constitutionality of governmentally
sponsored prayers at other public events.137  For now, all I mean to insist on
is that nearly everyone seems to agree that longstanding historical practice
can at least sometimes constitute a “gloss” on constitutional language and
that the glosses need not necessarily originate in the near aftermath of the
Founding as part of a self-conscious effort to “liquidate” or fix the Constitu-
tion’s meaning.
F. Historical Traditions
Historical traditions often shape judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.  The roles played by traditions in doing so appear quite various.  In
some cases, inquiry into the content of traditions may overlap with other
forms of historical inquiry, such as those involving original public meanings,
tive state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast
aside.”).
133 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 968 (1983) (rejecting the constitutionality of
the legislative veto despite vast usage of the veto “over the past five decades,” id. at 968
(White, J., dissenting), and explaining that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the pri-
mary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government and our inquiry is sharp-
ened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with
increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent
agencies,” id. at 944); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 7, at 423 (“[C]ourts do not always
treat the presence or absence of longstanding practice as dispositive.”).
134 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 702 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962)] brought many protests, for the habit of putting one sect’s prayer in public schools
had long been practiced.”).
135 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a state prohibition
against interracial marriage on equal protection and due process grounds).
136 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1845 (2014) (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (agreeing with “the Town and Court” that “a long history, stretching back to the
first session of Congress (when chaplains began to give prayers in both Chambers), ‘ha[s]
shown that prayer in this limited context could coexis[t] with the principles of disestablish-
ment and religious freedom’” (quoting id. at 1820) (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
137 See id. at 1845 (disagreeing with the majority about whether prayer at the beginning
of public sessions of a town’s governing body “fits within the tradition” of permissible gov-
ernmentally sponsored prayer (quoting id. at 1819 (majority opinion))).
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liquidation, and historical gloss.  Within the federal courts canon, an exam-
ple comes from the “public rights” tradition, which at least some Justices of
the Supreme Court appear to regard as partly defining the original meaning
of Article III’s provision that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”138  In interpreting this lan-
guage, the Supreme Court has frequently appealed to tradition as its basis for
distinguishing two categories of cases.  In those involving “private rights,” the
Court typically insists that “the essential attributes of the judicial power” must
be vested in Article III courts if they are to be vested in federal adjudicative
tribunals at all.139  By contrast, in cases involving what it has classified as
“public rights,” the Court has often said that Congress has greater discretion
to provide for adjudication by non-Article III tribunals such as administrative
agencies, the adjudicative officials of which lack Article III’s life tenure and
salary protection.140
The contours of the public rights tradition are much contested.141
Supreme Court decisions in recent decades have offered alternative, some-
138 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
139 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2011) (citing Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)) (finding a bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction to enter final judgment on a common law tort claim because the claim did not
fall within the public rights exception); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53
(1989) (“[I]f a statutory cause of action, such as respondent’s right to recover a fraudulent
conveyance . . . is not a ‘public right’ for Article III purposes, then Congress may not assign
its adjudication to a specialized non-Article III court lacking ‘the essential attributes of the
judicial power.’” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932))).
140 See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (“In
essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when
Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively
determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the
judicial powers is reduced.” (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (plurality opinion))).
141 Compare HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 332–33 (suggesting “three main classes
of cases have formed the doctrine’s core”: (1) “‘claims against the United States’ for
‘money, land or other things’”; (2) “[d]isputes arising from coercive governmental con-
duct outside the criminal law[,]” such as coerced payment of duties at the United States’
border; and (3) immigration issues and the surrounding body of law (quoting Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929))), with Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 566 (2007) (defining “public rights” as “interests that
enjoyed legal protection, but that belonged to ‘the whole community, considered as a com-
munity, in its social aggregate capacity,’” which historically divided into three categories:
“(1) proprietary rights held by government on behalf of the people, such as the title to
public lands . . . ; (2) servitudes that every member of the body politic could use but that
the law treated as being collectively held, such as rights to sail on public waters . . . ; and (3)
less tangible rights to compliance with the laws established by public authority ‘for the
government and tranquility of the whole’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *5–*7)).
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times conflicting formulations.142  The Justices have also disagreed about the
ultimate significance of the distinction between public and private rights in
resolving modern constitutional questions.143  There can be no doubt, how-
ever, that the tradition of distinguishing public from private rights has pro-
foundly shaped judicial doctrine governing the irreducible role of Article III
courts in the constitutional scheme and, correlatively, the permissibility of
congressional reliance on non-Article III tribunals.
In other contexts, appeals to tradition play a different role in cases
involving non-Article III federal adjudicators—one that is less obviously con-
nected, if connected at all, with determinations of original public meaning,
liquidation, or even historical gloss.  For instance, it appears to have emerged
as common ground that the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause “protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objec-
tively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”144  Some Jus-
tices believe that the protection of the Due Process Clause should extend
further.145  Others, with greater allegiance to originalism, have expressed
142 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614–15 (describing the “varied formulations of the public
rights exception in this Court’s cases” as, inter alia: “a matter that can be pursued only by
grace of the other branches,” (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)); “[a matter] that ‘historically could have been
determined exclusively by’ [the other] branches,” (quoting and citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 68 (plurality opinion)); a right that “flow[s] from a federal statutory scheme,” (citing
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584–85); a matter “‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a
claim created by federal law,” (quoting and citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 856); a matter “limited
to a ‘particularized area of the law,’” (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85 (plurality opinion));
and a matter whose facts are “‘particularly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task’” (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46)).
So too did the Court allude to a prior conception of “public rights” that it had previously
rejected. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613 (“Shortly after Northern Pipeline, the Court rejected the
limitation of the public rights exception to actions involving the Government as a party.”);
see also N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69 (“[A] matter of public rights must at a minimum arise
between the government and others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Justice Scalia
wrote with frustration of the “sheer numerosity” of these tests in his concurrence. See Stern,
131 S. Ct. at 2620–21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143 Compare Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611 (majority opinion) (finding dispositive the conclu-
sion that “[the Plaintiff’s] counterclaim cannot be deemed a matter of ‘public right’ that
can be decided outside the Judicial Branch”), with id. at 2626 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The
presence of ‘private rights’ does not automatically determine the outcome of the question
but requires a more ‘searching’ examination of the relevant factors.” (quoting Schor, 478
U.S. at 854)).
144 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
145 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are
the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.” (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting an interpretive approach that renders the
Constitution “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and
superstitions of a time long past”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Black-
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doubts that the Due Process Clause originally conferred any substantive pro-
tections at all.146  Nonetheless, nearly all seem to agree that historical tradi-
tion in recognizing an asserted right—such as a right of parents to control
their children’s upbringing147 or of competent adults to refuse unwanted
mun, J., dissenting) (“Like Justice Holmes, I believe that ‘[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.’ . . . I believe
we must analyze respondent Hardwick’s claim in the light of the values that underlie the
constitutional right to privacy.” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897))); see also DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 139 (criticizing Justice
Scalia’s reliance on a common law historical tradition to disclaim the right to die in Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), as follows:
“[T]here are many examples in constitutional history of constraints on liberty that were
unquestioned for long periods of history but were then reexamined and found unconstitu-
tional because lawyers and the public as a whole had developed a more sophisticated
understanding of the underlying ethical and moral issues. . . . Longstanding practice is an
even worse guide to constitutional law when technological change has created entirely new
problems or exacerbated old ones.”).
146 See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acqui-
esced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights.”).  Analysis
has revealed deep challenges in identifying the content of pertinent traditions, which can
often be described either broadly or narrowly.  In Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127, for example,
Justices Scalia and Brennan disagreed over the level of generality at which to define the
fundamental right in question.  Scalia characterized the claim before the Court as involv-
ing the purported parental rights of an “adulterous natural father,” id. at 127 n.6 (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.).  By contrast, Justice Brennan viewed the father as coming within a
tradition of legal respect for the more general rights associated with “parenthood,” id. at
139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  As both Justices acknowledged, their specific disagreement
reflected divergent assumptions about the level of generality at which rights and rights-
generating traditions should be defined. See id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.)
(“Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified.”); id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If we had
looked to tradition with such specificity in past cases, many a decision would have reached
a different result.”).  For commentary on Justices Scalia and Brennan’s debate over levels
of generality in defining fundamental rights, see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1614–29 (1990) (“Tradition, it thus
appears, rather than solving our problems, has proven to be a very troublesome concept.”);
Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, “The Right to Die,” and the Public/
Private Distinction, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 68–69 (1992) (finding it uncertain what result
Justice Scalia’s level of generality analysis would properly have yielded regarding “the right
to die” as explored in Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261); Tribe & Dorf, supra note 63, at 1058 (“The
more abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the
claimed right will fall within its protection.”).
147 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923) (finding parental rights to
control their children’s education among “those privileges long recognized at common
law”); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (reframing Meyer’s
stated right as the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control”).
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medical care148—provides support for claims that the right in question
enjoys constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause.149  Especially
for otherwise originalist Justices, who do not believe that the Due Process
Clause originally protected any substantive (as distinguished from procedu-
ral) rights, the purpose of inquiries into tradition is to determine what the
Due Process Clause, as previously interpreted by the courts to have a substan-
tive component, should now be interpreted to mean.150
In another form of reliance on historical tradition, some Justices have
also maintained that evidence of longstanding tradition can defeat claims of
constitutional right that otherwise might succeed.  Justice Scalia, for exam-
ple, has argued that judicially developed tests for gauging constitutionality
“cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect—those
constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s under-
standing of ambiguous constitutional texts.”151  Others of course disagree.
In United States v. Virginia,152 a majority of the Supreme Court, over Justice
Scalia’s protest, barred the traditionally sanctioned exclusion of women from
the Virginia Military Institute.  In Loving v. Virginia,153 the Court similarly
held that prohibitions against interracial marriage violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, despite plausible arguments that such prohibitions accorded
with long-settled tradition.  For current purposes, the important conclusion
is that even if evidence of traditional practice does not always determine the
outcome of constitutional cases, it is sometimes relevant, in diverse ways, to
constitutional analysis.
G. Historical Novelty
In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has accepted arguments that
the historical novelty of a form of governmental action weighs against its con-
148 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (“The principle that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”); see also Seidman, supra note 146, at
69 (identifying a “tradition restricting state interference with private decisions to refuse
treatment”).
149 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 & n.15 (1992) (interpreting
the Takings Clause as embodying principles that have “become part of our constitutional
culture” and that bar some “regulatory” as well as physical deprivations of property even
though “early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regula-
tions of property at all”).
150 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791–805 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first offering “mis-
givings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter,” but then arguing that the
right to bear arms is fundamental and thus deserves protection under the standing judicial
interpretation of the Due Process Clause).
151 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
152 Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
153 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
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stitutional permissibility.154  As so deployed, the concept of novelty does not
merely call attention to the absence of support from tradition for a claim of
constitutional right or prerogative.  More strongly, it supports a presumption
of unconstitutionality, at least in some contexts.155  For example, in the
important federal courts case of Alden v. Maine156 the Court cited the
absence of congressional attempts to subject the states to suit for statutory
violations prior to 1908 as supporting its conclusion that Congress could not
compel states to submit to suits against them in their own courts.157  In Printz
v. United States,158 the Court similarly treated the unprecedented character of
a statute directing state executive officials to enforce federal law as a factor
helping to establish its constitutional invalidity.159  The Court’s attention to
historical novelty in these cases is hardly anomalous.  In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),160 five Justices thought that the lack of
precedent for a mandate on individuals to purchase health insurance fur-
nished a reason to hold that Congress lacked the authority to impose such a
mandate under the Commerce Clause.161
154 See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (“Lack of
historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity.”); Sam Camardo, Note, Clio on
Steroids: Historical Silence as a Presumption of Unconstitutionality, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 523,
526 (2011) (criticizing the Court for adopting “[a] presumption that an unprecedented
governmental action is invalid because of its novelty”); Michael C. Dorf, The Troubling Emer-
gence of Novelty-Skepticism on the Supreme Court, VERDICT (July 1, 2013), http://verdict.justia
.com/2013/07/01/the-troubling-emergence-of-novelty-skepticism-on-the-supreme-court
(identifying “a troubling development that cuts across doctrinal areas: a recent tendency of
the Justices to presume that novel forms of legislation are unconstitutional in light of their
novelty”).
155 See Dorf, supra note 154.  The Court’s reliance on novelty as a ground for invalidat-
ing legislation has proven deeply controversial, in both concept, see, e.g., Camardo, supra
note 154, at 526, and application, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 953 n.12
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Congress’s “sparing use” of the comman-
deering power suggests not the power’s constitutional infirmity, but Congress’s laudable
“concern for the prerogatives of state government”).
156 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
157 See id. at 744–45.
158 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
159 See id. at 905–09; see also id. at 905 (“‘[C]ontemporaneous legislative exposition of
the Constitution . . . , acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be
given its provisions.’  Conversely if, as petitioners contend, earlier Congresses avoided use
of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought
not to exist.” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926))).
160 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
161 See id. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (finding dispositive the fact that “Congress
has never attempted to rely on [the Commerce] power to compel individuals not engaged
in commerce to purchase an unwanted product”); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas &
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (similarly referring to “the relevant history [which] is . . . that Con-
gress . . . has never before used the Commerce Clause to compel entry into commerce”);
see also Balkin, supra note 2, at 711 (detailing how challengers to Obamacare eschewed an
originalist approach in favor of a constitutional attack based on the challenged legislation’s
“unprecedented” character (citing JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
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With respect to the Constitution’s rights-conferring provisions, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Romer v. Evans162 relied on the novelty of a Colorado
constitutional amendment in denying a range of constitutional protections
to persons of “homosexual orientation” as a ground for holding it invalid.  “It
is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort,” he
wrote.163  Again in United States v. Windsor, in invalidating a provision of the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that denied federal recognition to
same-sex marriages sanctioned by state law, Justice Kennedy appealed to the
relevance of historical novelty: “DOMA, because of its reach and extent,
departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to define mar-
riage.  ‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the
[C]onstitution[ ] . . . .’”164  As that formulation suggests, the line between
reliance on novelty as an indicator of unconstitutionality and traditional
practice as a gauge of affirmative constitutional mandates can be a fine or
elusive one.  Clearly, however, majorities of the Justices regard historical evi-
dence of novelty as pertinent to the resolution of some cases.165
CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013))); Dorf, supra note 154 (describing NFIB v. Sebelius as a
leading example of novelty skepticism).  In Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008), the
Court similarly ruled that the  “unprecedented” nature of a presidential memorandum
directing state courts to give effect to a decision of the International Court of Justice
weighed against the directive’s constitutionality. Id. (“[T]he Government has not identi-
fied a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced
in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the
heart of the State’s police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judg-
ments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.”).
162 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
163 Id. at 633.
164 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
165 In the context of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, an impressive coali-
tion of Justices has agreed that any historically novel, content-based restrictions will trigger
strict judicial scrutiny.  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), for
example, in striking down a statute restricting the sale or rental of violent video games to
minors, the majority refused to create a category of unprotected speech absent “persuasive
evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized)
tradition of proscription.” Id. at 2734.  Although Justice Thomas dissented, he did so
based on an interpretation of the historical record as severely limiting the First Amend-
ment rights of minors. See id. at 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer would have
upheld the statute, but he agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny applied. See id. at
2761–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito concurred, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
finding the statute impermissibly vague. See id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring).  In United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), only Justice Alito dissented from a majority opinion
rejecting the “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope
of the First Amendment,” absent identification of a category that has “been historically
unprotected.” Id. at 472.  In the earlier, now canonical case of Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Court had similarly relied on historical novelty as a ground
for skepticism of constitutionality under the First Amendment: “The fact that for approxi-
mately one hundred and fifty years there ha[d] been almost an entire absence of attempts
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H. History Pertinent to the Synthesis of New Law into Prior Law
in Contexts of Transformative Change
All agree that constitutional amendments can transform what the Consti-
tution meant previously.  Similarly, a newly enacted statute can revise the
prior statutory landscape.  But the scope of any particular transformation can
provoke uncertainty or controversy.
Viewed from one perspective, debates about the meaning of constitu-
tional amendments and of statutes with potentially transformative implica-
tions are merely a subspecies of debate about original public meanings and
pose no distinctive methodological challenge.  In some cases, however, it
would be more misleading than illuminating to conceptualize the implica-
tions of a new amendment or statute as involving a linguistic fact, fixed at the
moment of pertinent language’s ratification or enactment.  According to a
leading philosopher of language, the paradigm case of “a sentence S” having
a linguistic meaning is one in which:
[A] speaker uses [that] sentence S to assert or stipulate . . . what a reasona-
ble hearer or reader who knows the linguistic meaning of S, and is aware of
all relevant intersubjectively available features of the context of the utter-
ance, would rationally take the speaker’s use of S to be intended to convey
and commit the speaker to.166
In constitutional law, especially in cases involving broadly transformative
alterations of the status quo ante, it will often be the case that neither the
amendment’s authors nor those in the surrounding legal community will
have anticipated or thought through all of an amendment’s potential impli-
cations.  In some such cases, history reveals, defining and delimiting the
reach of a transformative amendment or statute requires judges to go beyond
specifically shared intersubjective understandings and to engage in an intel-
lectually challenging process that Bruce Ackerman labels one of
“synthesis.”167
One important example involves the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
Fourteenth Amendment clearly had transformative purposes.  A Reconstruc-
tion Congress demanded ratification from defeated states of the former Con-
federacy as a condition of their renewed representation in Congress.168
Nevertheless, diverse congressional constituencies apparently preferred
to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance of public
officers is significant of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints would violate consti-
tutional right.” Id. at 718.
166 Soames, supra note 36, at 598.
167 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 304 (1991).
168 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013) (pointing to resulting constitutional difficul-
ties).  For an argument that the circumstances of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification
do not undermine its constitutional validity, see John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Recon-
struction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001).
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vagueness to clarity on vital points.169  Not surprisingly under the circum-
stances, courts began to struggle with questions about how to synthesize the
Fourteenth Amendment with prior constitutional understandings almost
immediately after the Amendment’s ratification.170  They continue to do so.
Although numerous examples populate the pages of the United States
Reports, here I shall offer just one, drawn from the heart of the federal courts
curriculum.  In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,171 the Supreme Court held that, the Elev-
enth Amendment notwithstanding, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to abrogate the states’ immunity from unconsented suit
for constitutional violations.172  In subsequent cases, the Court has worked
out the scope and implications of that ruling by holding that in order to pass
constitutional muster, a statute seeking to abrogate the states’ immunity must
be congruent with and proportional to an identified pattern of constitutional
violations.173  The Court’s “congruence and proportionality” test for permis-
sible abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment may or may not reflect a sensible synthesis of pre–Civil
War and Reconstruction assumptions about federal supremacy and state sov-
ereignty, but it is difficult to conceptualize as a simple determination of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The need for synthesis is also striking with regard to a number of Recon-
struction statutes that, if taken literally, would topple traditional, seemingly
settled understandings concerning the relationship of the states and the fed-
eral government and, especially, of federal judicial power to oversee the
operation of state governments.  Clear examples come from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which Congress originally enacted in 1871 and which creates a cause
of action for damages and injunctive relief against state officials who violate
federal constitutional or statutory rights.174  Among the questions that the
Supreme Court has had to decide in applying § 1983 are these:
169 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877, at 257–58 (1988) (noting that “[o]n the precise definition of equality before
the law, Republicans differed among themselves,” that “[e]ven moderates [in Congress]
understood Reconstruction as a dynamic process, in which phrases like ‘privileges and
immunities’ were subject to changing interpretation” and that moderates further “pre-
ferred to allow both Congress and the federal courts maximum flexibility in implementing
the Amendment’s provisions”).
170 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73–74 (1873) (severely limiting
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause based on an
imputed purpose to preserve a historically rooted distinction between privileges and immu-
nities of state citizenship and privileges and immunities of national citizenship).
171 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
172 Id. at 451–56.
173 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a con-
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.”).
174 The text of § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
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• Are all officials who violate constitutional rights—including judges
and prosecutors—absolutely liable for damages relief, or may some,
under some circumstances, claim “official immunity” based on analo-
gies to the immunity that officials enjoyed in suits at common law?175
• Does the authorization of injunctive relief override preexisting doc-
trines that would have precluded courts of equity from enjoining
pending state criminal prosecutions?176
• When, if ever, should prior state court decisions operate as bars to
federal adjudication under doctrines of claim and issue preclusion?177
• Does the § 1983 cause of action extend to current or former state pris-
oners who could instead have asserted their constitutional claims in
habeas corpus actions?178
With respect to questions such as these, to all of which the Supreme
Court has given complex answers that deviate from the statute’s “literal
meaning,”179 it frequently seems folly to expect a clear original understand-
ing, in part for reasons involving uncertainty and reasonable disagreement.
Rather, the challenge for the courts is to figure out how most sensibly to
resolve particular disputes in light of history-based considerations that
include prior practice, settled expectations, motivating congressional pur-
poses, and other enactment history.  Judges most typically do so by appealing
to a normatively soaked notion of what a reasonable legislator would have
intended or a reasonable interpreter would have understood the meaning or
implications of a legal enactment to be.180
Some might reply that, even if I am correct about what the Supreme
Court has done historically, the Court has erred by straying into the domain
of normative analysis.  As I have argued, however, reasonable members of the
generations that enacted relevant texts—viewing them in their legal, linguis-
tic, and historical contexts—would frequently have divided about their mean-
ing, or at least about how they applied to particular cases, and would have
done so on normatively suffused grounds.181  In such cases, a modern inter-
preter also must make partly normative judgments.
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
175 For an overview of debates surrounding official immunity doctrine, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 994–1011.
176 For a summary of pertinent doctrine and surrounding debates, see id. at 1083–128.
177 See id. at 1320–34.
178 See id. at 1334–46.
179 Cf. Solum, supra note 23, at 487 (“In law, we refer to semantic content as ‘literal
meaning.’” (citations omitted)).
180 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 685, 690–724 (2014).
181 See supra subsection I.C.4.
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I. Prior Judicial Decisions and Their Historical Meanings
Above I referred to the potential of nonjudicial practice to settle ques-
tions of constitutional meaning and application.  But lawyers more com-
monly think of settlement as coming through judicial precedent.182
Viewed from one perspective, a judicial precedent is a kind of historical
fact, the significance of which can provoke debate.  The question of signifi-
cance takes on special importance insofar as a precedent decides a question
about the original public meaning of a constitutional or statutory provision
in a way that subsequent judges could plausibly think mistaken.  In such
cases, a judicial precedent not only resolves a particular case, but also leaves a
question for the future: Which historical phenomena—those bearing on the
original meaning of a provision or those bearing on the best interpretation
of the precedent—matter more?
In recent decades, courts and commentators have heatedly debated
questions involving the authority of precedents that might be judged errone-
ous if measured against originalist criteria.183  Despite disagreement on
much else, most judges, Justices, and commentators agree that the doctrine
of stare decisis sometimes, but not always, authorizes or requires courts to act
182 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014) (“Stare
decisis, we have stated, ‘is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, pre-
dictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial deci-
sions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’
Although ‘not an inexorable command,’ stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of
law, necessary to ensure that legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion.’
For that reason, this Court has always held that ‘any departure’ from the doctrine
‘demands special justification.’ (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 828
(1991), Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986), and Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,
212 (1984))).
183 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989)
(examining how courts are constrained by incorrectly decided precedents); Randy E. Bar-
nett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COM-
MENT. 257, 262 (2005) (noting the difficulty that precedent can pose for originalism);
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (examining the interaction between precedent and theories of
constitutional interpretation); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE L.J. 503, 505 (2000) (examining precedent and congressional power); Gary Law-
son, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24 (1994)
(arguing that, in some circumstances, precedent is unconstitutional); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 723 (1988)
(arguing that much precedent cannot be reconciled with originalism); Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (arguing for a con-
ception of stare decisis without a presumption against overruling “demonstrably erroneous
precedent”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 (2000) (examining the
power of Congress to abrogate stare decisis); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Cor-
rupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) [hereinafter Paulsen,
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence] (arguing that stare decisis always corrupts constitutional
theories of interpretation); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987)
(examining the justifications for and effects of precedent).
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contrary to what otherwise would be the best interpretation of constitutional
language.184  In weighing when precedent should trump original meanings,
moreover, nearly all agree that the answer may depend on more history.185
As a historical matter, what has happened since the precedent-setting deci-
sion was rendered?  If reliance has developed—a question largely of histori-
cal fact—then the reliance provides a reason to adhere to the precedent.186
On the other hand, if reliance has not developed, or if further historical
experience has undermined the viability of the precedent, then this more
recent history will also assume legal significance.187
Another historically focused question arising within the doctrine of stare
decisis involves what, exactly, a precedent established.  To take just one cur-
rently live example, an important debate has developed around Ex parte
Young,188 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal injunction barring
the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute that violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.189  In a relatively undisputed aspect of its decision,
the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief
against a state official acting in his official capacity, even though the judicial
order precluded the state from enforcing its law.190  In addition, many com-
mentators have long viewed Ex parte Young as having established a more gen-
eral federal right to sue directly under the Constitution for injunctive relief
184 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 413; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Prece-
dent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1129–31
(2008).
185 The Supreme Court laid out some of the pertinent considerations in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations . . . . Thus, for
example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965);
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation,
e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more
than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989); or whether facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification, e.g., Burnet [v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)]
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
186 See, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their
acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
involved . . . .”).
187 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (noting the appropriateness of
overruling when “the theoretical underpinnings of [prior] decisions are called into serious
question”); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173 (terming overruling justified when a past decision is
“irreconcilable” with intervening developments).
188 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
189 Id. at 168.
190 Id. at 155–56.
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from ongoing constitutional violations.191  Professor John Harrison has chal-
lenged that interpretation on historical grounds.  He contends that Ex parte
Young instead merely applied, without extending, a traditional equitable doc-
trine authorizing antisuit injunctions in cases in which the party seeking equi-
table relief would have had a valid defense in an action at law.192  On this
reading, Ex parte Young created no precedent for the award of federal injunc-
tive relief against allegedly unlawful and even unconstitutional conduct in
other circumstances.
In a recent case, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four dissenters, would
have adopted a restrictive, historically based interpretation of Ex parte Young
analogous to that which Professor Harrison has advanced,193 but with a dis-
tinctive twist.  The Chief Justice appeared to view Ex parte Young as the well-
spring for a constitutional (rather than merely a common law) cause of
action under the Supremacy Clause to enjoin coercive state action that vio-
lates the Constitution.194  But, like Harrison, Chief Justice Roberts would
read Ex parte Young and the modern cause of action that he traces to it as
authorizing only “the pre-emptive assertion in equity of a defense that would
otherwise have been available in the State’s enforcement proceedings”195—
and not, as others have contended, as encompassing actions to enforce
states’ affirmative duties under federal law (such as those to make payments
under federally funded programs).196  Debates about the historical founda-
tions and meaning of Ex parte Young have grown heated197 largely because
those on both sides assume that constitutional litigation may turn on the out-
191 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 891.
192 John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990–91 (2008).
193 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–13 (2012) (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Roberts was joined in his dissent by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito).
194 Id. at 1213.
195 Id. (quoting Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1642 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196 See, e.g., Carlos M. Va´zquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unrav-
eling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 21
(1998) (“If Edelman merely protects states from suits seeking money from the state trea-
sury, then Ex parte Young is not a narrow exception to a broad rule of immunity for state
actors; rather, it establishes a bright line between federal-law suits against states and fed-
eral-law suits against state officials.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte
Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 13, 16 (2012) (“Young is part of a jurisprudential imperative
recognizing the ability of litigants to enjoin any unconstitutional state action without a
distinct statutory right to do so—because the Constitution itself may in some cases require
such a remedy.”).
197 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 196, at 14 (noting that “scholars continue to debate the
origins and scope of the 1908 [Ex parte Young] decision”); Larry Yackle, Young Again, 35 U.
HAW. L. REV. 51, 58 (2013) (“It is arguable that Young proceeded from the premise that a
claim that state rail rates conflicted with the Federal Constitution could be advanced under
the authority of the Supremacy Clause.”).
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come.198  Once again, the point that deserves emphasis is that the historical
question involves matters other than the original public meaning of constitu-
tional language.  Centrally at stake is the question of what Ex parte Young held
as a historical matter, and thus provides a precedent for, rather than what the
Constitution originally meant.
J. History Tending to Discredit Precedents
Given the authority normally accorded to judicial precedents under the
doctrine of stare decisis, some Justices and commentators have argued—with-
out so far arousing prominent cries of methodological resistance—that
extraordinary pressures on the courts that rendered particular rulings should
undermine those rulings’ claims to adherence.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,199 Jus-
tice Scalia disparaged the precedential significance of Ex parte Quirin,200 in
which the Court upheld the use of a military commission to try an American
citizen accused of war crimes, as “not this Court’s finest hour.”201  As bases
for that conclusion, Justice Scalia pointed out that “[t]he Court upheld the
commission and denied relief in a brief per curiam issued the day after oral
argument concluded”202 and that when the Court finally explained its rea-
soning in a written opinion issued several months later, its distinction of an
earlier precedent sought “to revise [that case] rather than describe it.”203
Although Justice Scalia did not say so, historical evidence suggests that Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt, through ex parte communications by his Attorney
General, had threatened the Justices with defiance if the Court forbade the
use of a military tribunal to try an alleged traitor who had taken up arms
against the United States in wartime.204
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,205 Justice Souter similarly suggested
that the earlier case of Hans v. Louisiana,206 which had advanced an expan-
sive interpretation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, should receive less than full-blooded precedential authority because it
was decided under a different kind of threat: if the Court had upheld the
198 For a wise overview of the controversy, see David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the
Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 69, 87 (2011) (hypothesizing that scholars have
tended to read Ex parte Young through the lens of their own ideologically charged prefer-
ences and expectations).
199 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
200 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
201 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 570 (describing Ex parte Quirin’s description—or revision—of Ex parte Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).
204 See Alexandra D. Lahav, Rites Without Rights: A Tale of Two Military Commissions, 24
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 439, 446 (2012) (describing how Roosevelt conveyed to his Attorney
General, Francis Biddle, a statement emphatically declaring that he would not hand over
the defendants tried in a military commission pursuant to any writ of habeas corpus and
Biddle then conveyed this message to the Justices on the Court).
205 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
206 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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existence of federal jurisdiction to enforce the Contract Clause against the
states in suits alleging nonpayment of debts, states would flout the ensuing
judgments.207  Under these circumstances, Justice Souter thought it “not
wholly surprising that the Hans Court found a way to avoid the certainty of
the State’s contempt”208 by offering a broad interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, but he maintained that even if “history explains” Hans, it “does
not honor[ ] Hans.”209  He implied, though he did not state explicitly, that
these circumstances bore on the proper approach to and analysis of Hans by
the Supreme Court in a case in which Hans was cited as a potentially control-
ling precedent.210
K. Changed Historical Circumstances
In a variety of contexts, the outcome of constitutional controversies
hinges on substantially historical inquiries into whether circumstances have
changed materially since the time of a prior legal event.  As I have noted
already, such inquiries feature centrally in decisions concerning whether
stare decisis governs.211  In another set of cases, the question involves the
possibility that historically changed understandings have undermined the
assumptions on which earlier interpretations of federal statutes or even the
Constitution rested.
Within the universe of constitutional cases, Brown v. Board of Education212
unquestionably provides the most famous example.  In holding public school
segregation inherently unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
despite prior rulings applying the “separate but equal doctrine,” Chief Justice
Warren’s unanimous opinion cited both changes in the significance of public
education and advances in psychological knowledge.
207 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 121 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 122.
210 See id. (“The ultimate demerit of the case centers, however, not on its politics but on
the legal errors on which it rested.”).  A number of commentators have also sought to
undermine the precedential authority of Supreme Court decisions by pointing out unsa-
vory circumstances surrounding their rendition. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED 166 n.* (1975) (questioning “whether the modern lawyer and scholar must for-
sake all the slavery cases as too infused with a substantive issue to be of any use in under-
standing our federal system” in the context of a discussion of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842)); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 LAW & HIST.
REV. 653, 713–15 (2013) (suggesting that a “doubly troubling precedent” should receive
little to no precedential weight due to the circumstances surrounding its decision).
211 See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
212 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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With the details of Brown’s analysis remaining controversial,213 a case at
the heart of the federal courts curriculum, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,214
may illustrate even more convincingly that courts sometimes cannot ignore
changed legal and factual understandings in interpreting federal statutes and
the Constitution.  Virtually from the time of the Founding, the Federal Rules
of Decision Act has provided that “[t]he laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”215  In
an 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,216 the Supreme Court held that the phrase
“the laws of the several states” did not comprise at least some state court
decisions interpreting and applying “general principles of commercial
law.”217  In so holding in Swift, and in subsequent cases that built on it, the
Court apparently assumed that there existed a body of “general” common
law, reflecting custom and reason, that was not necessarily and distinctively
the law of any particular state or jurisdiction.218  Where general law applied,
the odd practical consequence, at least from a modern perspective, was that
state court interpretations did not bind federal courts under the Rules of
Decision Act, nor did federal judicial interpretations bind state courts under
the Supremacy Clause.219
By the middle of the twentieth century, the view that there existed a
body of “general” common law that was neither federal law nor state law, and
that neither federal nor state courts could interpret with ultimate authority,
appeared to many if not most jurists to have grown untenable.220  A question
then arose about the continuing supportability of the doctrine that had
developed on the foundation of Swift v. Tyson.  In Erie, the Supreme Court
repudiated its prior interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act and held that
state common law rulings constitute “state law” binding on the federal courts
in common law diversity actions unless a federal rule of decision applies.221
213 See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001) (collecting suggestions for improvements in Brown’s legal analysis); Mark
G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research
in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978) (“Virtually everyone who has
examined the question now agrees that the Court erred [in its reliance on the specific
social science data in question].  The proffered evidence was methodologically unsound.”).
214 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
215 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
216 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
217 Id. at 18, 22.
218 For a brief survey of surrounding history and relevant literature, including subse-
quent extensions of Swift, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 553–58.
219 See id.
220 Perhaps the most influential attack came in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(attacking the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law outside of any partic-
ular State but obligatory within it [upon federal courts] unless and until changed by
statute”).
221 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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The Alien Tort Statute (ATS),222 which has survived without amend-
ment since 1789, presents modern courts with an analogous interpretive
conundrum.  The ATS confers federal court jurisdiction in “civil action[s] by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”223  In
the words of one commentator, it “was enacted . . . as a national security
statute” to afford remedies to British merchants, creditors, and others for
injuries “for which the United States bore responsibility under contempora-
neous international law.”224  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,225 in which a modern
plaintiff sought to rely on the ATS to recover for international human rights
violations occurring outside the United States, the Supreme Court agreed
unanimously that the ATS was jurisdictional only; it neither created a cause
of action nor conferred an independent authority on federal courts “to mold
substantive law.”226  Yet the ATS clearly presupposed not only the existence
of “the law of nations,” but also the availability of some source of law—which
may have been “general” law—authorizing tort actions in cases involving
breaches of the law of nations.  So reasoning, Justice Souter’s opinion for the
Court held that federal courts could entertain suits under the ATS for torts
that would have been actionable under the ATS at the time of the ATS’s
enactment.227  Over the protest of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,228 Justice Souter also held that no develop-
ment subsequent to 1789 had “categorically precluded federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of [judge-made
federal] common law.”229
Further perplexities and disputes surrounding modern doctrines involv-
ing federal common law may similarly fall within the category of cases in
which judges must take account of changed historical circumstances in order
to resolve cases with constitutional dimensions.  As acknowledged in Sosa,
and contrary to many a law student’s misimpression, Erie did not abolish the
category of federal common law, but only of federal general common law.230
Today there are important enclaves of federal common law, but it is real
federal law, binding on state courts under the Supremacy Clause as much as
on federal courts.231  Given changed historical understandings, the Supreme
222 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
223 Id.
224 Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the Judici-
ary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2014).
225 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
226 Id. at 713.
227 See id. at 729–32.
228 See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
229 Id. at 725 (majority opinion).  A subsequent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013), limited the reach of the ATS by reading it in light of
a presumption that statutes lack extraterritorial application.
230 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 607–742 (discussing federal com-
mon law).
231 See id. at 616–17 (citing Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405, 421–22 (1964)).
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Court now must wrestle with a number of issues involving the current status
of pre-Erie cases that crafted or relied on “general” common law rules of deci-
sion in a universe in which a modern federal common law rule of decision
would preempt state law and bind state courts under the Supremacy Clause.
The lively debates over whether, and if so when and why, customary interna-
tional law forms a part of the federal common law of the United States turn
largely on issues of this nature.232
L. Historical Trend Lines Bearing on Intra-Temporal Coherence
I referred earlier to the pertinence of Founding-era legal culture in
determining how constitutional and statutory language should be read and
how judges should decide cases.233  But understandings of the appropriate
judicial role, and surrounding conceptions of proper interpretive methodol-
ogy, change over time.  When the trend line exhibits disparities between the
jurisprudential or methodological assumptions exhibited in past judicial
decisions and those that have more recently gained approval, questions
emerge about whether norms of current practice can justify the revision of
prior precedents that have not otherwise proved unworkable.  Resolving
these questions requires a mix of historical and normative analysis.
A recent example of doctrinal reform to reflect changed understandings
of appropriate constraints on judicial decisionmaking involves “prudential”
standing doctrine.  As formulated by the Supreme Court in cases decided
during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the doctrine of standing
involves proper parties to litigate legal issues in federal court.234  Emphasiz-
ing standing’s roots in the separation of powers, a number of past decisions
insisted that standing has a prudential as well as a constitutional compo-
nent.235  As the Supreme Court pointed out in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc.,236 however, the notion that the federal courts
could make prudential decisions not to decide cases within their statutory
jurisdiction coheres badly with repeated affirmations in other contexts that
the federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise all of the
jurisdiction that the Constitution and laws of the United States confer on
them.237  In light of that historically sharpening disparity,238 Lexmark not
232 For overviews of the issues and a survey of the literature, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 67, at 675–85; Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002).
233 See supra Section I.B.
234 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“[N]o justiciable controversy is
presented . . . when there is no standing to maintain the action.”).
235 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2004); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975).
236 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
237 See id. at 1386 (identifying “tension” between prudential standing doctrine and the
principle affirmed in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs “that a federal court’s obligation
to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging” (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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only trimmed one branch of prudential standing doctrine, but also intimated
that further retrenchment may lie ahead.239  More generally, I think it fair to
say that the Court’s unanimous decision in Lexmark reflects an uncontrover-
sial assumption that recent history and precedent, including precedent
involving appropriate interpretive methodologies, sometimes requires a
rethinking—which necessarily blends historical with normative considera-
tions—of previously settled doctrines.
* * *
The point of the foregoing summary is fivefold.  First, historical inquiry
and analysis are pervasive in constitutional law, as demonstrated by a number
of cases and issues—most of which have not been thought to raise any large
question of methodological principle—at the center of the federal courts
canon.  Second, the types of historical inquiry and analysis that bear on con-
stitutional adjudication are highly diverse, by no means limited to questions
about the original understanding or original public meaning of constitu-
tional language.  Third, the original public meaning as it features in constitu-
tional analysis is frequently indeterminate in its application to particular
cases.  As a result, conclusions about the proper application of law to resolve
particular issues often cannot rest directly on any historically discernible
fact—for the discernible facts stop short of establishing the necessary conclu-
sion—but instead must reflect judgments about how uncertainty or disagree-
ment would best have been resolved in the historical past, in a sense of “best”
that cannot be wholly value-free.  Fourth, in cases of conflict between the
decisions that judges otherwise would render in light of evidence of the origi-
nal public meaning and other historically grounded considerations (such as,
for example, liquidated meaning, historical gloss, tradition, or stare decisis),
the judicial view of the most reasonable application of the original public
meaning does not always prevail.  Instead, the Justices make judgments that
238 As emphasized by Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 72 (1984), abstention doctrine had always been at odds
with the resounding dictum of Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), that “[w]e have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”  But subsequent practice devi-
ated considerably from the Cohens dictum. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543–45, 574–75 (1985) (maintaining that “suggestions of an overrid-
ing obligation, subject only and at most to a few narrowly drawn exceptions, are far too
grudging in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction” and that
judicial discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction “has ancient and honorable roots at
common law as well as in equity”).  In the last several decades, the Court has expressed
increasing skepticism in varied circumstances of claims of judicial authority to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that Congress has conferred. See Sprint Commc’ns, 134 S. Ct. at 591
(emphasizing the “virtually unflagging” obligation of federal courts to exercise the jurisdic-
tion that Congress has given them (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716
(1996) (same).
239 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 & n.4.
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blend historical with normative considerations.  Fifth, even in cases in which
judges and Justices perceive a conflict between the original meaning of con-
stitutional language and some other history-based consideration, few if any
Justices of the Supreme Court have consistently maintained that the original
meaning—the identification of which may itself require normative judg-
ments—should always determine judicial outcomes.240
II. PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS
Before inquiring whether most or all of the historical phenomena that
matter in constitutional adjudication ought to matter, it will be useful to
explore how and why the current state of affairs has developed.  Because the
leading causal factors emerge so nearly self-evidently from the Part I’s cata-
logue of types of historically rooted reasoning, I shall be very brief.
A. The Fixation Thesis
In thinking about how a diverse set of historical phenomena can bear on
constitutional analysis, we can best begin with “the fixation thesis” that,
according to Professor Lawrence Solum, represents the central tenet of
originalist constitutional theory: events involved in the drafting and ratifica-
tion of a constitutional provision determine its meaning.241  Although Solum
advances the fixation thesis as a pillar of constitutional originalism, either a
weak version of that thesis or a weaker analogue thereto defines a consensus
starting point among constitutional analysts.  With rare exceptions, all agree
that the Framers’ intent, the original public understanding, or the original
public meaning of constitutional language (to the extent that it can be ascer-
tained) at least provisionally fixes constitutional meaning and that it also con-
tinues to fix constitutional meaning into the distant future, absent some
significant consideration dictating a different conclusion.242  The two main
disagreements involve the determinacy with which historical evidence can
establish an original meaning in some cases243 and the questions of whether
and when a “fixed” meaning might become unfixed as a result of stare deci-
sis, historical gloss, traditional practice, or changed historical circumstances.
But it is important to recognize common ground.  If, for example, a dispute
arose about the meaning of a constitutional amendment that had been rati-
fied a year earlier, the notion that courts could reject the original under-
standing or original public meaning and decide on the basis of some other
consideration would seem preposterous.
240 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 184, at 1129–31 & nn.83–84.
241 See Solum, supra note 1, at 459; Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 1, 36–63
(2011).
242 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
243 On disagreements among originalists with respect to this question, see supra notes
81–89 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, all of the forms of historical evidence that bear on the origi-
nal intent, original understanding, or original public meaning possess rele-
vance to at least some interpreters.  Given what I have just said about a virtual
consensus acknowledging the relevance of Founding-era history, here I refer
more qualifiedly to “at least some interpreters” because, as Part I emphasized,
the original intent, original understanding, and original public meaning
represent different objects of historical inquiry.244  Even among originalists,
debate surrounds the question of their relative pertinence.  Strikingly, more-
over, some participants in constitutional debate may have no consistent, set-
tled view on the question of exactly which kinds of historical facts—for
example, those bearing on the Framers’ intent or purposes, or those evidenc-
ing public understandings—determine constitutional provisions’ original
meanings.  Whether self-consciously or not, some interpreters, perhaps
because they recognize the importance of continuity with the Founding era
but lack a settled view of exactly how that continuity should be maintained,
may make decisions on a case-by-case basis, sometimes emphasizing the origi-
nal understanding, sometimes original intentions, sometime original pur-
poses, and so forth.  As Part I may have intimated and as I shall explain more
fully below, I do not regard eclecticism of this kind as necessarily mistaken.
B. Vague, Indeterminate, or Contestable Original Meaning
Despite reasonable disagreement about the proper focus of original his-
torical inquiry, I now want to bracket the points of dispute insofar as possible
and emphasize more generally that historical facts alone will frequently fail to
prove the existence of an original intent, original understanding, or original
public meaning that is sufficiently clear and determinate to resolve modern
controversies.  On this point I adopt an admittedly controversial view, but
one that should attract broad (even if not unanimous) agreement.  Several
routes lead to the same conclusion.  One involves embrace of a distinction
that many originalists endorse between constitutional meaning, which is
often vague, and the judicial constructions or implementing doctrines that
courts must develop to reach determinate results in disputed cases.245
Another acknowledges the possibility of reasonable disagreement about orig-
inal meaning but allows for the exercise of normatively guided judgment in
ascertaining which of the contending candidates is most reasonable or best
supported and thus is correct.  Further, in an implicit recognition that histor-
ical indeterminacy is ineradicable, nearly everyone agrees that that there are
at least some circumstances in which practice and judicial precedent can—in
Madison’s word—“liquidate” the meaning of otherwise unclear constitu-
244 See supra Part I.
245 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.  I previously defended such a distinc-
tion, which I characterized as one between constitutional meaning and the doctrines
through which the Constitution’s meanings implemented, in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5–7 (2001).
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tional language,246 and that there are other circumstances in which practice
that postdates the Founding era can put a gloss on vague language or in
which tradition can guide its proper interpretation.  The absence of a deter-
minate original meaning that is ascertainable as a pure matter of historical
fact also helps to define the challenge of what Part I labeled as “synthesis”:
How would a reasonable or wise or prudent interpreter understand a newly
enacted or ratified provision as having altered the preexisting legal land-
scape, as that provision was surely intended to do, but without necessarily
having wiped the slate clean in a way that would entail adverse, probably
unforeseen consequences?247
My references to vague or indeterminate original meanings of course
beg a central question: If vagueness, indeterminacy, and ambiguity come in
degrees—as I assume that they do—how much suffices to license considera-
tion of post-Founding history, including longstanding practice and judicial
precedent, as potential grounds for judicial decision?248  Though emphasiz-
ing common ground, I do not wish to obscure important sources of
disagreement.
C. Doubts About Meanings Provisionally Liquidated Through
Practice and Precedent
Assume that a provision becomes part of the Constitution at Time 1
(T1).  Practice or judicial precedent liquidates or “precisifi[es]”249 the rele-
vant language at Time 2 (T2).  A controversy about the application of the
provision then erupts at Time 3 (T3).  In debates about precedent-based con-
stitutional adjudication, the most obvious and heated question involves
whether a T2 interpretation or construction that ignored, rejected, or misun-
derstood the actual T1 meaning should control a later dispute, notwithstand-
ing its originally mistaken character.  I shall come to that issue below.  For
the moment, in explicating how and why a variety of kinds of historical
inquiry play roles in constitutional adjudication, I want to focus on two more
mundane issues.  Both can arise even on the assumptions that the original
constitutional meaning was and remains vague or disputable and that the
precedent most centrally in issue does not flatly contravene the vague origi-
nal meaning.
First, the historical meaning of a constitutional precedent established at
T2 may itself be in issue (as distinguished from the T1 meaning of the under-
246 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 197–98 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999);
see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 91, at 645–46.
247 See supra Section I.H (discussing “synthesis”).
248 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Appraising the Significance of the Subjects and Objects of the
Constitution: A Case Study in Textual and Historical Revisionism, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 453,
474–77 (2013) (discussing the degree of certainty required for judicial decision as to the
original meanings of constitutional language).
249 See Soames, supra note 36, at 604–05 (describing the need for “precisification” when
“the asserted or stipulative content of a legal provision is vague, and facts crucial to the
resolution of the case fall within the range of this vagueness”).
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lying constitutional provision).  Above I discussed the debate that has
recently erupted concerning how judges and lawyers understood the ruling
in Ex parte Young at the time of its decision.  In this context, nonoriginalist
history obviously matters.250  The content of purportedly longstanding prac-
tices and traditions can also provoke historical debate and interpretive disa-
greement, even on the assumption that historical gloss is permissible or that
traditional practice can possess authoritative weight.251
Second, past decisions that otherwise would have counted as permissible
interpretations or liquidations of either the Constitution’s or a statute’s origi-
nal meaning may become contestable because of subsequent historical devel-
opments.  As Part I explained, Swift v. Tyson, which appears to have assumed
the existence of a body of general law that is neither federal law binding on
state courts under the Supremacy Clause nor state law binding on the federal
courts under the Rules of Decision Act, may exemplify the challenge
presented by past decisions founded on faulty jurisprudential assump-
tions.252  Claims that past decisions rested on erroneous methodological
premises involve similarly historical judgments about those precedents’
foundations.
D. Conflicts Between Precedent and Original Meaning
Above I noted that the most contentious question arising within the doc-
trine of constitutional precedent is when, if ever, courts should adhere to an
originally erroneous judicial decision—or, analogously, to an originally erro-
neous liquidation or historical gloss—to reach an outcome contrary to that
indicated by the Constitution’s original understanding or original public
meaning.  But I know of no Justice of the Supreme Court, including those
presently serving, who has held consistently to the view that subsequent his-
torical developments can never displace the authority of original constitu-
tional meaning.253  The self-identified originalist Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas exemplify the historical pattern.  Justice Scalia defends
judicial practice in sometimes adhering to initially mistaken precedents as an
“exception” to his otherwise originalist philosophy.254  Justice Thomas, too,
has joined opinions that would be difficult or impossible to support on
originalist grounds.255  Qualified acceptance of the authority of nonoriginal-
250 See supra notes 188–98 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 146.
252 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
253 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1129–31 & nn.83–84.
254 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 411–13.
255 For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Justice
Thomas joined an opinion by Justice Scalia that relied on prior Court decisions to support
its holding that the Takings Clause restricts “regulatory as well as physical deprivations” of
property, despite historical evidence that the Clause was not originally so understood. Id.
at 1028 n.15.  Justice Thomas also joined an opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 213–31 (1995), that relied on precedent to subject federal affirmative action
programs to strict judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding often voiced arguments that the con-
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ist precedent expands, rather than contracts, the range of historical consider-
ations pertinent to constitutional adjudication.  Anyone who believes that
stare decisis can ever trump original meanings will sometimes have reason to
inquire into historical phenomena that respectively bear on the T1 meanings
of constitutional provisions, on the T2 meanings of T2 precedents, and on
the criteria for overruling precedents in order to return to T1
understandings.
In my view, for reasons that I shall discuss more in Part III, historical
practice in acknowledging that precedential meanings can sometimes dis-
place what otherwise would be identified as original meanings possesses
enormous legal significance.  Most obviously, if treated as authoritative, his-
torical practice would explain judges’ and Justices’ consistent attention to
nonoriginalist historical considerations even when those considerations
point to results that diverge from the Constitution’s original meaning.  For
the moment, however, I am content to note that disagreement exists on this
point—though I want to recall, in doing so, that a question of parallel impor-
tance has also been left hanging: How much indeterminacy, vagueness, or
ambiguity concerning original meaning is enough to justify reliance on
nonoriginalist history as a permissible liquidation of or gloss on original
meaning?256
* * *
From my account of why even those judges and Justices who accept some
version of the fixation thesis nevertheless accord significance to a broad
range of historically based considerations, it is possible to draw some general,
even if partially speculative, conclusions.
First, T1 meaning is frequently an object of both conceptual and eviden-
tiary dispute.  Conceptually, there are disagreements and uncertainty about
whether to equate original meaning with the Framers’ intentions or pur-
poses, historically understood meanings, or public meanings as understood
by hypothesized “reasonable” people who might have disagreed with some or
even many of their historically actual contemporaries.  With respect to evi-
dence, disagreement about constitutional meaning or application was an eas-
ily provable historical phenomenon with respect to many points.
Second, the contestability and vagueness of T1 meaning naturally and
almost inevitably give pertinence to a number of historical factors either in
ascribing T1 meaning or in developing doctrines to implement it, regardless
of whether one associates it with the Framers’ intent, the original under-
standing, or the original public meaning of constitutional language.
Third, the need to liquidate, specify, or precisify vague or disputed origi-
nal meaning introduces a still further number of historically grounded con-
stitutional provision on which the decision was based, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, was not originally understood to bar racially discriminatory legislation.
256 See supra notes 119–23 (discussing disagreement among the Justices in Noel
Canning).
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siderations—sometimes put under the headings of historical gloss or
historical tradition—into efforts to ascribe constitutional meaning at T3 and
thereafter, following the exercise of judgment and possible commission of
error in ascribing meaning at T2.
Fourth, throughout the process of assigning relative significances to
sometimes competing historical considerations, judges and Justices experi-
ence pervasive pressures to make historically grounded judgments that pro-
duce practically sensible, workable, and just outcomes.  Perhaps the most
potent testimony to this conclusion emerges from the sometimes grudging
but apparently unanimous acknowledgment of every Justice ever to have
served on the Supreme Court that erroneous judicial precedent should
sometimes prevail over what they otherwise would have adjudged to be the
Constitution’s original meaning.257  The pressure to adhere to precedent
reaches its zenith in cases in which its rejection would have morally or practi-
cally adverse consequences that would likely trigger widespread public
outrage.258
Fifth, notwithstanding the diversity of potentially relevant historical con-
siderations, judges and Justices pervasively understand their role as one of
resolving current controversies based on past, authoritative decisions by
others, including the Constitution’s authors and ratifiers, officials who have
helped to liquidate or gloss vague constitutional provisions, and the courts.
The “dead hand of the past”259 is not an enemy of sound current adjudica-
tion but an almost universally acknowledged constituent thereof.  In so rec-
ognizing, moreover, we would do well to revise the metaphor.  The varieties
of historical consideration that matter to constitutional law function less as a
single hand, whether dead or living, than as a multitude of hands that have
contributed to and continue to shape our current constitutional law.  None
of these hands is easily discarded.  In the much quoted words of Justice
Holmes, insofar as law is concerned, “continuity with the past is not a duty, it
is only a necessity.”260
We cannot, however, cease our investigations with this celebration of
Holmes’s enduring insight.  To the contrary, Holmes’s epigram frames,
rather than resolves, the issues with which participants in constitutional
debate frequently must struggle, involving which elements of the past furnish
the most relevant touchstones for particular decisions.
III. A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE VARIETIES OF LEGALLY
PERTINENT HISTORY
The summary points with which I respectively concluded Parts I and II
are mostly empirical or analytical, not unequivocally normative, but in my
257 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
258 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1118–46.
259 See Horwitz, supra note 9, at 471.
260 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 138,
139 (1920).
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view they have normative implications, including these: (1) it is legally per-
missible for judges to place weight on multiple kinds of historical phenom-
ena in deciding constitutional cases; (2) indeed, judges may sometimes have
an obligation to do so; (3) the original understanding or best original inter-
pretation of the meaning of constitutional language should not always con-
trol the outcome of constitutional litigation; and (4) in identifying legally
pertinent history and in determining which elements of it should dictate the
outcome in particular cases, judges necessarily and appropriately blend his-
torical with normative analysis.
The route to these conclusions requires a short journey into the domain
of analytical jurisprudence, to explain how current and historical judicial
practice support claims about legally authorized judicial action and judicial
obligation.  Because I have covered the relevant terrain in previous writ-
ing,261 I shall move swiftly here.
A. The Fallacy of “The Command Theory”
I said above that either some version of the fixation thesis—which holds
that the Constitution’s meaning is fixed, at least initially, at the time of its
ratification262—or a weaker analogue is almost indisputably true.  In refer-
ring to a weaker analogue, I meant to leave open the possibility that the Con-
stitution’s meaning might change at T2 or T3 under some, so far unspecified,
circumstances.  In this Part, the question involves the foundational questions
that one must answer in order to determine whether either the fixation thesis
or the analogue that I have posited as an alternative is true or false.  What
makes it the case that the Constitution’s meaning is either unchangeable or
changeable?  Practical as well as theoretical consequences may hinge on the
answer.
One possible answer to questions about whether the Constitution’s
meaning can change under any circumstances, and how we can know
whether change is possible, would echo a jurisprudential theory known as
“the command theory.”263  According to the command theory, law repre-
sents the command of the sovereign; reciprocally, the commands of the sov-
ereign constitute law.264  Applied to the Constitution, this theory would
identify what the Constitution calls “We the People” as the sovereign lawgiver
and postulate that “We the People” directed that the Constitution should
stand as the supreme law of the United States unless and until amended in
the manner specified by Article V.265
261 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1148–50 (discussing “superprecedents”).
262 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832),
reprinted in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE xxv, 13–14 (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., 1954) (1832) (postulat-
ing that the “commands” of the sovereign constitute the law).
264 See id. at 13–14.
265 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 36–37 (explicating the application of the command
theory).
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If the command theory were correct, it would provide strong support
for—and perhaps dictate—the maximally robust version of the fixation thesis
that I have referred to as exclusive originalism: the Constitution’s meaning
was fixed definitively by what “We the People” meant at T1, or by what rea-
sonable people at T1 took it to mean, regardless of anything that may have
happened at T2, and T1 meaning (as appropriately identified) therefore
holds legal precedence over any other consideration at T3.266  Difficulties in
applying the command theory of course might arise.  Disagreements could
persist about how to determine what the Framers intended or about what the
original public meaning was.  Nonetheless, efforts to resolve disagreement
would need to accord with the command theory’s fundamental tenets.
It would serve no good purpose, however, to attempt to work out the
details of an exclusive originalist position that would satisfy the command
theory.  As recognized by nearly all participants in modern jurisprudential
debate—including positivists, natural lawyers, and those who try to straddle
the positivist/natural law divide—the command theory is bankrupt.267
Although superficially appealing to some, the command theory’s explanation
of why the Constitution is law today almost precisely reverses the order of
pertinent considerations.  The Constitution does not enjoy the status of law
because the Framers commanded that we should obey it.  At earlier times,
King George and the British Parliament and then the Articles of Confedera-
tion asserted analogous claims to obedience, but no one today regards their
commands as valid law in the United States.  Rather, if we ask why or in virtue
of what the Constitution is the supreme law of the United States, the short
answer is that it enjoys that status because it is accepted as the supreme law—
not because the Founding generation commanded future generations to
obey it, nor because the processes of its adoption established continuing obli-
gations of obedience to it.268
The significance of recognizing that the foundations of American consti-
tutional law lie in current acceptance of the Constitution as authoritative
emerges when we press the questions of who has accepted what and of what
besides the written Constitution might also enjoy lawful status as a result of
acceptance.  Upon analysis, it will turn out that just as acceptance confers the
status of supreme law upon the written Constitution of the United States,
266 See McConnell, supra note 9, at 1132 (locating “the theoretical foundation of
originalism” in the premise that “[a]ll power stems from the sovereign people, and the
authority of the Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it,” and
reasoning that “[i]t follows that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with
their understanding”).
267 Perhaps because the command theory is a positivist theory, which seeks to identify
law and explicate its nature by reference to social facts rather than moral criteria, the
canonical critique is that offered by the leading modern positivist, H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18–78 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994); id. at 79–80
(providing a concise summary of the critique).
268 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1126 (attributing the theoretical foundations of this
insight to HART, supra note 267).
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acceptance also underwrites the authority of the interpretive assumptions
and practices that make the Constitution meaningful and it give it life.269
B. A Practice-Based Theory of Law
With the Constitution’s status as the supreme law depending on accept-
ance, the best jurisprudential theory will be a practice-based theory, in the
sense of “practice” in which philosophers sometimes use that term.270  So
employed, it refers to activities that are constituted by the convergent or over-
lapping understandings, expectations, and intentions of multiple partici-
pants.271  In the most widely embraced practice theory of law, Professor
H.L.A. Hart referred to the criteria that officials and especially judges apply
in identifying what the law is and means as “rules of recognition” that he
suggested could be traced to a master “rule of recognition.”272  Hart’s reli-
ance on the concept of a rule of recognition was misleading.273  As he later
made explicit, he did not mean to imply that judges and legal officials who
practiced or applied rules of recognition could necessarily state the rule or
rules to which they conformed.274  Rather, Hart used the term “rule” in the
sense explicated by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein,275 who—on a non-
skeptical interpretation—identified the ability to follow a rule with the
shared, often tacit, understandings of most or all participants in collective
activities concerning how to “go on” in ways that others will acknowledge as
appropriate or correct.276  In a formulation that Hart embraced, “the test of
whether a man’s actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can
269 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV.
621, 654 (1987) (asserting that “the force of precedent . . . is an aspect of our law because
of acceptance”); Steven D. Smith, Stare Decisis in a Classical and Constitutional Setting: A
Comment on the Symposium, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 168 (2007) (observing that “it would
seem that stare decisis is legally secured on the same basis as the Constitution itself”).
270 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 184, at 1118.
271 Id.; see Michael Sean Quinn, Practice-Defining Rules, 86 ETHICS 76, 76 (1975).  For
other influential discussions of the concept of a practice, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187–88 (2d ed. 1984); Thomas Morawetz, The Rules of
Law and the Point of Law, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 859–60 (1973); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 3–4 (1955).
272 See HART, supra note 267, at 94–95, 100–10.
273 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1127.
274 See HART, supra note 267, at 101 (“In a modern legal system where there are a vari-
ety of ‘sources’ of law, the rule of recognition is correspondingly more complex: the crite-
ria for identifying the law are multiple and commonly include a written constitution,
enactment by a legislature, and judicial precedents.”).
275 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953).  For explorations of Wittgenstein’s views about the nature of rule-following,
see WITTGENSTEIN: TO FOLLOW A RULE (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds.,
1981).
276 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 81 (2001).
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formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a
wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does.”277
I would add as a further qualification that many of the “rules” of Ameri-
can legal practice, which are frequently tacit rather than canonically
inscribed, are vague or indeterminate in some applications.  Interpretive dis-
agreement is commonplace, as every lawyer knows.  In cases of disagreement,
a practice-based jurisprudential theory helps to elucidate the core of agree-
ment from which disagreement emerges, without necessarily resolving or
even aspiring to resolve it.
C. The Varieties of History Pertinent to Constitutional and Legal Interpretation
Within a practice-based theory of law, the widespread, openly acknowl-
edged behavior of judges and Justices in taking account of a multiplicity of
historically rooted factors—and in not always affording lexical priority to
original meanings of legal enactments, as best they could be identified with-
out reference to subsequent historical phenomena—helps to support an
argument that their practice in doing so, which frequently requires norma-
tively inflected judgments, is legally authorized and sometimes required.278
This is a deliberately cautious, preliminary statement of a position to which I
shall shortly give a more robust formulation.  For the moment, however, I
need to proceed cautiously, due to the challenge posed by the phenomenon
of interpretive and methodological disagreement in constitutional practice.
Although the Supreme Court frequently ascribes legal significance to a
wide variety of historical phenomena, judicial opinions, as well as surround-
ing commentary, include strident debate about the permissibility of courts
doing so.  In particular, some Justices, echoed by more law professors, some-
times complain that courts have no legally legitimate authority to deviate
from the Constitution’s T1 meaning, even when other historical considera-
tions would indicate that they ought to do so.279
277 See HART, supra note 267, at 289 (characterizing his view as “similar” to that—which
is quoted in the text—of PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE 58 (R.F. Holland ed.,
1958)).  Although Hart put officials and especially judges at the center of his account of
the rule or rules of recognition, see HART, supra note 267, at 256, the practice of judges and
Justices of the Supreme Court needs to be seen as nested among, and sensitive to, the
understandings and practices of nonjudicial officials—on whom the enforcement of judi-
cial rulings may depend—and of the concerned public. See Fallon, supra note 184, at
1138–42.  Judicial practices that deviated too far from public understandings of appropri-
ate judicial behavior in identifying and applying the applicable law could not long survive
in a political democracy in which judicial appointment occurs through politically accounta-
ble processes. See id. at 1140–42.
278 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1129–31 (developing a similar argument with respect
to the legal permissibility of precedent-based decisionmaking).
279 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 832–34 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Scalia was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.);
Barnett, supra note 183, at 269–70; Lawson, supra note 183, at 29–30, 33; Paulsen, Intrinsi-
cally Corrupting Influence, supra note 183, at 291.
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In considering how judges and concerned citizens should appraise argu-
ments that a certain kind of historical consideration should be deemed irrel-
evant or insubstantial in a particular case, even though courts have taken
account of it in the past, Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation as
“constructive interpretation”—which correctly postulates that the founda-
tions of law are inherently practice-based—furnishes a helpful framework.280
According to Dworkin, theories of legal interpretation should be tested
against the twin criteria of “fit” and normative attractiveness.281  To be eligi-
ble for adoption, a legal theory must fit both legal authorities and widely
accepted methodological practices reasonably well.  But considerations of fit
are not wholly independent of appraisals of moral desirability.  Taking these
two concerns simultaneously into account, judges, according to Dworkin,
should adopt the interpretation that is normatively best.282
Dworkin’s methodological recommendation seems to me to be roughly
correct in its account of what American judges do and ought to do in cases in
which no relatively determinate, widely practiced, tacit norm of adjudication
dictates the relative significance of competing historical considerations.283
In such cases, a judge has no choice but to exercise judgment, and the requi-
site judgment has an irreducibly normative dimension.  To put the point dif-
ferently, a judge who simply wants to follow the law in such cases confronts a
body of law the interpretation of which requires normatively inflected judg-
ment if it is to yield a determinate outcome to the case at hand; and a nearly
universally accepted norm of practice establishes that judges must pronounce
280 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52–73 (1986).  Although Professor Dworkin,
like Professor Hart, championed a practice-based theory of law, see id. at 45–53, his theory
differed importantly from Professor Hart’s, which Dworkin aspired to refute and displace.
Despite the scope of Dworkin’s ambition, many of his objections to Hart’s theory resulted
from a principal focus on different questions. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on Dwor-
kin and the Two Faces of Law, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 557 (1992).  Whereas Professor
Hart was mostly concerned to explain the nature of a legal system, many of Professor Dwor-
kin’s central insights involved legal interpretation, especially in hard or otherwise contesta-
ble cases. See id.  Indeed, as Hart recognized in a postscript to the second edition of his
jurisprudential classic The Concept of Law, there is no ultimate inconsistency between his
social-fact-based, “positivist” account of the nature of a legal system and a theory of adjudi-
cation, such as Dworkin’s, that calls for judges to take normative considerations into
account in determining what the law means or requires in hard cases. See HART, supra note
267, at 241 (“It is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant
conflict between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin’s conceptions of legal
theory.”).  Accordingly, my embrace of Dworkin’s theory that legal interpretation is a form
of “constructive interpretation” does not imply a rejection of Hart’s view—on which I
relied earlier—that the foundations of law lie in social facts.
281 See  HART, supra note 26, at 229–30, 254–58.
282 See id.; see also DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 2–3 (explaining the possibility of identify-
ing judicial liberals and conservatives as reflective of the irreducible element of moral judg-
ment in legal interpretation).
283 See COLEMAN, supra note 276, at 100 (characterizing the rule of recognition in the
United States as a conventional “framework for bargaining” that may frequently “involve
moral or political arguments” about “how to go on”).
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determinate conclusions.  It is simply not open to a judge to pronounce that
neither of the parties to a case can prevail because no widely acknowledged
interpretive norm clearly governs.
Embrace of a response to hard cases that requires judges to weigh con-
siderations of normative attractiveness along with fit invites attack from two
directions.  According to one criticism, permitting judges to make normative
judgments in determining which historically rooted considerations to take
into account is objectionably subjective: judges with different values will
reach different conclusions.  As I have said, however, there is no evident
alternative in cases of methodological disagreement.  Absent determinative
guidance from clear rules, judges, lawyers, and other participants in constitu-
tional practice must decide for themselves what methodological approach
they ought to use.
From another perspective, demands that judgments of appropriate
interpretive methodology should “fit” existing practice are viciously circular
and substantively misguided: the “fit” criterion effectively stipulates that the
improper practice of past judges can license improper future practice.284
This criticism rightly points out that any practice-based theory of law contains
an irreducible element of circularity: what is accepted as law determines what
the law is, either directly in cases of consensus or partly when otherwise dis-
putable questions must be resolved based on a mix of fit with past practice
and normative attractiveness.  Though the circle cannot be broken entirely, a
practice-based jurisprudential theory at least explains the necessary founda-
tions of any functioning legal system in practices of acceptance.285
Once the criterion of “fit” is accepted, any theory that denies the occa-
sional relevance to constitutional adjudication of a broad range of historical
considerations, and disallows the need for normative judgment in determin-
ing how to weigh them in particular cases, fares extremely poorly.  As Part I
suggested, the norms that undergird current practice do not demand that
conclusions regarding the original intent or original public meaning of con-
stitutional or statutory language must invariably take priority over other his-
torically grounded considerations.  Settlement by practice or precedent often
occurs.  Changed understanding of the judicial role and its foundations can
unsettle precedent.  Synthesis often requires the blending of historically
inflected concerns across historical eras.
Acknowledgment of the possibility and significance of shifting under-
standings of the judicial function introduces a further complexity.  Among
other things, it furnishes a reminder that tacit norms of practice can evolve,
as I signaled above in discussing the pertinence of “historical trend lines
bearing on intra-temporal coherence,” such as those that have prodded the
Supreme Court’s recent reevaluation of decisions involving “prudential”
284 Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592, 2605, 2614, 2617 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing an “adverse possession” approach to the sepa-
ration of powers under which past constitutional usurpations are said to justify future devi-
ations from original constitutional norms).
285 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1131.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 57 20-JUL-15 11:45
2015] the  roles  of  history  in  constitutional  adjudication 1809
standing.286  Sometimes discontinuities in widely shared conceptions of the
judicial role may be sharp, as in the case of the jurisprudential revolution
that vindicated the New Deal and surrounding conceptions of governmental
power and authority.287  Sometimes changes in judicial practice and the tacit
norms that surround it may be more subtle and gradual, as reflected, for
example, in the influence of public opinion on judges’ and Justices’ histori-
cally shifting sense of what is legally thinkable or unthinkable.288  In recent
decades, increasing reliance on originalist and textualist interpretive prem-
ises may reflect other alterations in prevailing, tacit understandings of the
nature and limits of properly judicial authority.289  Nevertheless, any theory
that purported wholly to reject the authority of “the dead hand of the past”
would fail the “fit” test even more grossly.  At and after T2, judges, other
public officials, and the public embrace the authority of the Constitution and
of decisions implementing and interpreting it as largely—even if not
entirely—definitive of the American legal system.
Arguing on normative grounds, proponents of exclusive originalism
(and a paired, highly stringent version of “textualism” in statutory cases)290
frequently emphasize the desirability of constraining judicial choice in ascrib-
ing legal meaning.291  But the constraint that they offer is often more chi-
merical than real, especially when one recognizes, as Part I argued, that an
original meaning of constitutional language that is sufficiently determinate
to resolve concrete cases frequently cannot be identified as a matter of simple
historical fact.292  In cases of indeterminacy or dispute, judgments about the
Constitution’s meaning, construction, or application have an inescapably
normative dimension—as they have since the days when Hamilton and
Madison, Jefferson and Jay disagreed with one another.
Acknowledging the indeterminacy of their approaches, originalists
sometimes say that at least they offer more constraints on judicial subjectivity
than do their rivals.293  In my view, the difference becomes more than slight
286 See supra Section I.L.
287 For an account that characterizes the resulting shift as reflecting a de facto constitu-
tional amendment, see ACKERMAN, supra note 167, at 47–50, 99–130.
288 For a sustained examination of the effect of public opinion on the Supreme Court
and the Justices’ evolving conceptions of their role-based powers and obligations, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 75.
289 On the increasing influence of originalism on constitutional thinking, including by
judges and Justices, see Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
290 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 42, at 17–18 (“The practical threat is that, under the guise
or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges
will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires . . . .”).
292 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 20, at 736 (maintaining that a number of interpretive
methodological as well as substantive issues “were actually deeply contested in 1788”); Nel-
son, supra note 7, at 575–77 (arguing that the “original meaning” of the Constitution
depended on the “applicable interpretive conventions”).
293 See, e.g., J. Daniel Mahoney, Thoughts on Originalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1225,
1232–33 (1997) (acknowledging that “[t]he discovery of original meaning is a daunting
but not impossible task,” but arguing that, notwithstanding this challenge, “[t]he great
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only for those versions of exclusive originalism that would preclude judges
from ever displacing T1 meanings (in full recognition of the vagaries sur-
rounding their identification) with the premises of T2 precedents, liquida-
tions, glosses, traditions, and syntheses.  This no-holds-barred, let-the-chips-
fall-where-they-may form of exclusive originalism—which, I emphasize, is not
the only or even the predominant form of originalism—seems to me to be
both hubristic in its rejection of more than 200 years of American interpre-
tive tradition and reckless in its proud obliviousness to potential conse-
quences.  Most originalists, I emphasize once more, appear to concur in this
judgment.  Potentially at risk are the constitutional validity of paper money
and Social Security,294 the continuing authority of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,295 and the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states.296  Justice
Scalia has reportedly said “I am an originalist, but I am not a nut.”297  The
implied contrast is apt.  Full-blooded exclusive originalism would be a nutty
view.
At the same time, a total rejection of the authority of past deci-
sionmakers to fix binding law for the present would engender a degree of
legal uncertainty that only an anarchist could welcome.  Although allusion to
“the dead hand problem”298 may have attractions as a rhetorical trope in
arguments against exclusive originalism, the solution to that “problem”
surely does not reside in a denial that lawmakers at T1 can legally and mor-
ally legitimately control events at and T3 insofar as their legal authority to do
so is accepted as a matter of social fact.
* * *
In concluding this Part, I must take care not to overstate what my argu-
ments against exclusive originalism, in particular, have established.  Debate
about appropriate interpretive methodology is a part of our interpretive prac-
tice.299  Accordingly, arguments to the effect that judges and Justices should
henceforth hew exclusively to the Framers’ intent or the most reasonable
original specification of original public meanings cannot be dismissed as sim-
ply legally out of bounds.  Such contentions need to be confronted and
refuted.  What is more, the arguments for and against exclusive originalism
virtue of originalism for judges that are required to decide constitutional cases is that it
leads them in the direction of objectivity and away from the imposition of a personal
agenda in the name of the law”); Scalia, supra note 31, at 856, 863 (acknowledging that “it
is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text,” but
nevertheless suggesting that originalism, notwithstanding its imperfections, is the best
available theory because it offers more determinacy than its rivals).
294 See Monaghan, supra note 183, at 733–34, 744–45 (listing the constitutional validity
of Social Security and paper money as difficult to justify on originalist principles).
295 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 12.
296 See id. at 15.
297 See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 103 (2007).
298 See Horwitz, supra note 9, at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted).
299 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1144–46.
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have an irreducibly comparative dimension.  In response to arguments that
exclusive originalism would be normatively unattractive, the exclusive
originalist fairly parries: Compared with what?  This is an important question,
which I shall discuss at length in Part IV.  In so acknowledging, however, I
want to be clear about how this seeming concession relates to the central
themes of this Part.  If the arguments for exclusive originalism could succeed
at all, they would need to succeed on normative and comparative, rather
than narrowly jurisprudential, grounds involving the mistaken command the-
ory.  As this Part has shown, it is simply fallacious to maintain that law, inher-
ently and necessarily, represents the commands of T1 lawmakers, interpreted
as T1 lawmakers would have intended or most reasonably understood them,
or that the legal meaning of a constitutional or statutory provision is necessa-
rily fixed irrevocably at the moment of its enactment.
IV. A COMMON LAW-LIKE APPROACH TO THE VARIED ROLES OF HISTORY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL (AND SOMETIMES STATUTORY) ADJUDICATION
Before going forward, we should pause to take stock.  Part I identified a
diverse variety of historically based phenomena that sometimes matter to
constitutional adjudication.  Part II offered an explanation of how and why it
has come about that judges and Justices accord legal significance to many
types of historically rooted inquiry, even if they accept some version of the
fixation thesis or a weaker analogue.  Moving into the terrain of analytical
jurisprudence, Part III rejected the “command theory” that might, if it were
valid, support an exclusive originalist approach to constitutional adjudica-
tion.  Instead, it argued that the best theory of law will be practice-based.  In
light of the conjoined theses of Parts I and II, Part III further argued that no
interpretive theory as confining as the most stringent versions of exclusive
originalism fits our practice at all well.  Neither, of course, does any theory
that categorically renounces “dead hand” control.
At this point, however, we are still left with a question that includes both
empirical and normative elements: Which kinds of historical considerations
do and should matter, and how much should they matter, under which cir-
cumstances?  Although I have offered severe criticisms of exclusive original-
ism, and argued provisionally for its rejection, much hinges on finding an
acceptable answer to the question that I have just posed.  In the absence of a
normatively acceptable response, some relatively stringent form of exclusive
originalism might, after all, emerge as the best—or as the least bad—inter-
pretive theory, almost by default.
This Part defends an interpretive approach that assesses the relative legal
significance of a multitude of historically grounded considerations on a flexi-
ble, common law-like basis.  After first sketching the basic elements of such
an approach, this Part illustrates how it would work in practice through dis-
cussion of both hypothetical and actual constitutional cases.  These applica-
tions should help to refute objections that a more rigidly specified theory is
needed to avoid rampant subjectivity and unpredictability in constitutional
adjudication.
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These applications also support a number of important generalizations,
which I shall offer in Section C, about when originalist considerations do and
do not, and should and should not, prevail in constitutional argument.
Although flexible and subject to exceptions, these generalizations mark what
I hope will be important elements of common ground concerning the roles
of different kinds of historically based arguments in most originalist and
nonoriginalist theories alike (though not, of course, in the exclusive original-
ist theories that I regard as outliers).  A final Section attempts to make sense
of what might appear to be exclusively originalist rhetoric in judicial
opinions.
A. The Basic Elements of a Common Law-Like Approach
To questions involving the comparative constitutional significance of
varied kinds of historically grounded factors, my answer is inelegant, but also
serviceable and prudent: different priority rules appropriately apply to differ-
ent kinds of cases, as the immanent norms of constitutional practice—in the
sense explicated in Part III—wisely recognize.300  To be more precise, most
300 In an article written more than twenty-five years ago, I defended a multi-factor
approach to constitutional adjudication. See Fallon, supra note 129.  That article began
with a descriptive summary of the kinds of arguments on which the Supreme Court rou-
tinely relies in at least some constitutional cases. See id. at 1194–209.  These include argu-
ments asserting claims about the necessary meaning of the Constitution’s language,
concerning the original intent or original public meaning of particular provisions, drawing
implications from the Constitution’s overall structure, relying on precedent, and appealing
to considerations of normative desirability.  Beyond its organizing typology, my article
advanced two main arguments.  First, although the various types of constitutional argu-
ment can be described as conceptually distinct from one another, in practice they are
pervasively interdependent. See id. at 1240–42, 1252–68.  By training and instinct, well-
socialized participants in American constitutional practice gravitate to accounts of the
arguments within the various categories that render them mutually consistent.  Signifi-
cantly, the relevant consistency extends into the category of value arguments.  It is no acci-
dent, I argued, that those engaged in constitutional argument and adjudication so
regularly reach conclusions that they find normatively palatable if not ideal.  Second, in
cases in which it proves impossible to achieve a principled “coherence” among the various
categories of argument, I argued that those categories have lexical rankings. See id. at
1243–46.  The highest, I wrote, attaches to arguments based on the Constitution’s text. See
id. at 1244.  A textually insupportable conclusion cannot be reached, however powerful the
arguments that otherwise would support it.  The second priority, I argued, goes to argu-
ments based on the Framers’ intent or the original public meaning of constitutional lan-
guage. See id. at 1244–45.  Arguments from constitutional structure, precedent, and value
arguments trail in the hierarchy. See id. at 1245–46.
In retrospect, I believe that my earlier article did a better job of framing a problem
that previously had been largely overlooked than of solving the problem that it framed.
That problem—recognition of an analogue of which also motivates this Article—is that our
constitutional practice not only legitimates diverse kinds of arguments, but also, in doing
so, generates the possibility of conflict among them.  In cases of conflict, one then must
ask: Which of the pertinent considerations should determine the outcome?  Insofar as the
coherence-seeking process that I described permits this question to arise, I am now uncer-
tain that it has a categorical answer.
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people who are well trained in and socialized into American constitutional
practice—which is to say, most judges and lawyers—will have no doubt about
how to “go on” correctly in most cases, including those involving a conflict
between different kinds of historically grounded considerations.
Other, “hard” cases will of course provoke disagreement.  No sensible
person has ever thought that disputable cases could be avoided entirely.  In
hard cases, the need for interpreters to exercise normative judgment
becomes palpable, but not undesirable.  It is difficult if not impossible to
imagine a legal theory in which good judging did not require good
judgment.
When judges and lawyers explain why a particular result is the right one
in a case in which different historical considerations point in different direc-
tions, they often offer generalized methodological explanations—involving,
for example, the significance of the original public meaning of constitutional
language or the applicability or nonapplicability of the “policy” of stare deci-
sis.301  Such explanations are appropriate and often illuminating.  But meth-
odological explanations of this kind aim to describe or interpret norms of
practice that are frequently flexible and dynamic.  Accordingly, judicial
explanations—even when cast in seemingly categorical form—should be
understood as revisable in the way that statements of common law rules gen-
erally are, subject to being distinguished or allowing for exceptions in future
cases.
This acknowledgment of the revisable character of methodological gen-
eralization by no means disparages critical analysis or demands for principled
consistency.  The traditional hallmark of legal reasoning inheres in its analyti-
cal rigor.  A common law-like approach offers no amnesty to fuzzy thinking.
Insistence on as much precision as the nature of the subject matter permits is
always in order.  Self-contradiction reveals legal arguments, like all others, as
bankrupt.
Professor Balkin’s recent article about the roles of nonoriginalist history in constitu-
tional adjudication, see generally Balkin, supra note 2, attacks the kind of categorization of
constitutional arguments that my earlier article—like the well-known work of Philip Bob-
bitt on “modalities” of constitutional argument—develops. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL FATE 9–119 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13
(1991).  According to Balkin, a multitude of kinds of historical argument pervades and
cuts across the categories that Professor Bobbitt and I tried to distinguish. See generally
Balkin, supra note 2.  I do not now quarrel in any way with Professor Balkin’s claim that
judges and lawyers engage in historically based argumentation of all of the kinds that he
identifies. See supra note 15 (summarizing Balkin’s eleven-part catalogue).  As noted
above, however, the alternative categorization that I have developed in this Article seeks to
map out the varieties of historical consideration that judges and lawyers not only some-
times appeal to, but widely regard as capable of authoritatively settling or unsettling a
claim of constitutional meaning, at least in some cases.
301 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (noting that the
Court treats stare decisis as “a principle of policy” and not as “an inexorable command”
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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What is more, the kind of cataloguing project on which I have embarked
in this Article not only invites, but also shows the need for, critical examina-
tion of the categories of historical argument that I have identified and the
concepts on which they depend.  To cite just a few examples of the kind of
scholarly work that can contribute to critical thinking, Caleb Nelson has very
usefully exposed possible ambiguities in the Madisonian notion of “liquida-
tion” of constitutional meaning through practice and precedent.302  As
noted above, important questions include whether “liquidation” necessarily
occurred either close to the Founding era or not at all and whether liquida-
tion at one time necessarily fixes constitutional meaning forevermore.303
Following Nelson’s work, others need to consider more clearly exactly what
“liquidation” is, when and how it can occur, and what degree of permanence
it implies.  In other recent scholarship, Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison
have similarly probed the sometimes complacent notion that longstanding
executive practice, when acquiesced in by Congress, can constitute a gloss on
constitutional meaning, and they have offered analytical benchmarks for jus-
tifiable claims of acquiescence.304  More recently still, Curtis Bradley and
Neil Siegel have shown the importance of distinguishing the concepts of liq-
uidation and historical gloss—at least in usages that treat the latter as more
capacious than the former—and of attending carefully to the normative costs
and benefits of crediting the latter as a source of constitutional authority.305
By its nature, a common law approach relies on critical analysis and debate to
promote intellectual progress.  Any decent, practice-based interpretive theory
will include a theory of mistakes that permits judges to reject or revise some
(though not all) elements of prior practice as either incongruous with other
elements or as normatively indefensible.306
The normative case for a common law-like approach to the weighing of
sometimes competing, historically based considerations has two main ele-
ments, both of which reflect loosely Burkean premises.307  The first involves a
respect for the accreted wisdom implicit in longstanding but organically
evolving structures of law and categories of legal analysis.308  The second
embodies a skepticism of current human capacity to anticipate and resolve
sagaciously, via rigid prescriptive theories such as exclusive originalism, all of
the currently unimaginable interpretive challenges that law and government
will confront in the future.  In this context, prudence counsels acknowledg-
ment of the limits of human foresight in crafting and pledging adherence to
categorical interpretive rules.
302 See generally Nelson, supra note 7.
303 See supra Section I.D.
304 See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 7.
305 See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 7.
306 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 118–23 (1977).
307 My argument here, including the invocation of Burke, largely follows the more gen-
eral argument of STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 33–49, in favor of a common law-like approach
to constitutional adjudication.
308 See id. at 42.
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B. A Common Law Approach in Practice
The obvious risk of a common law approach is that the immanent norms
of constitutional practice may prove less constraining than I have suggested.
If so, an authorization of case-by-case judicial judgment in appraising some-
times competing historical considerations would threaten pervasively unpre-
dictable or ideologically driven constitutional decisions.  But that risk is
substantially smaller than proponents of exclusively originalist theories often
acknowledge.  If we bracket abstract methodological debates about the rela-
tive merits of competing prescriptive theories—as has perhaps typically hap-
pened in the discussion of federal courts issues, at least when discussion has
not become methodologically self-conscious—those schooled in constitu-
tional practice will converge in their judgments far more often than not.  In
this Section, I first offer support for the claim that methodological eclecti-
cism pursuant to a common-law-like approach will not typically produce any
more eccentric, ideologically charged judgments than would more rigid
interpretive theories by examining a number of “easy” cases.  Having sup-
ported my claim about the convergence of judgment in a selection of easy
cases, I attempt further to illustrate how a common law-like approach might
function by examining two hard cases in which methodological disagree-
ments admittedly come to the fore.
1. Some “Easy” Cases
In examining easy cases, I begin with a hypothetical issue concerning
which I expect nearly every legally trained person—and perhaps other
informed citizens as well—to share a confident legal intuition that the origi-
nal understanding of constitutional language ought to control the outcome.
I then briefly discuss four cases in which legal scholars have advanced argu-
ments based on the original public understanding or public meaning that
would call for relatively dramatic revisions of long settled practice or prece-
dent.  In each of these cases, I argue that some other kind of historical con-
sideration should be, and I believe very widely would be, regarded as
determinative.
a. Removal of Life-Tenured Judges
Imagine that either political liberals or Tea Party conservatives earn a
watershed victory in a future set of presidential and congressional elections.
Looking to consolidate their victory by remaking the federal judiciary, party
leaders seek legal advice on whether they can, by legislation, remove all sit-
ting federal judges from office and thereby permit the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to reconstitute the federal judiciary.
Confronting this hypothetical case, I would expect nearly every compe-
tent lawyer to conclude that the plan violates the guarantee of Article III that
federal judges will hold office during “good [b]ehaviour.”309  Without more
309 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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facts than I have provided, nothing in the hypothetical furnishes any ground
for uncertainty or puzzlement about the appropriateness of adherence to this
linguistically and historically intuitive conclusion about original constitu-
tional meaning, which more than two hundred years of subsequent practice
have ratified.
Seeking traction for a contrary argument, a devil’s advocate—or a parti-
san—might point to the historical experience of 1802, in which, after a water-
shed election, Congress repealed the 1801 Judiciary Act (which had been
enacted by a lame duck Congress following the 1800 elections) and thereby
effectively removed sixteen federal judges.310  Although the Supreme Court
never passed on the constitutionality of that action,311 surrounding legisla-
tive debates included assertions by members of the newly installed Republi-
can majority that Article III imposed no barrier to the abolition of judgeships
for the nonpunitive purpose of promoting economy and efficiency in govern-
mental operations.312  Perhaps trouble lurks here for advocates of a common
law-like approach to the pertinence of various kinds of history and for exclu-
sive originalists alike.  Perhaps a good lawyer should maintain a cautiously
noncommittal attitude about the original public meaning of Article III’s
“good behavior” guarantee, at least prior to the completion of more histori-
cal research.  Maybe the T1 meaning of the Good Behavior Clause was rele-
vantly indeterminate.  But my legal instincts make me deeply skeptical that a
single, historically controverted, seemingly partisan congressional action in
1802 could either authoritatively establish or definitively liquidate the origi-
nal meaning of Article III in a way that would permit the removal of all
current federal judges.  To the contrary, subsequent practice bespeaks a
longstanding traditional adherence to what appears intuitively to have been
the Good Behavior Clause’s original public meaning.
b. Advisory Opinions
In an informative historical study, Professor Stewart Jay has argued that,
the judgment expressed in The Correspondence of the Justices to the contrary
notwithstanding,313 the original public meaning of Article III imposed no
barrier to advisory opinions by Article III judges.314  Against the background
of British history and prior practice, Jay maintains, President Washington and
Secretary of State Jefferson correctly interpreted Article III as permitting the
President to solicit the Supreme Court’s legal advice in a matter of high pub-
lic importance.315
Suppose that Congress, by statute, were to prescribe a mechanism by
which the President might solicit advisory opinions.  Should the Supreme
310 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
311 See ACKERMAN, supra note 101, at 179–98.
312 See SIMON, supra note 74, at 49–73.
313 See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
314 See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS (1997).
315 See id. at 10–101 (marshaling pertinent evidence).
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Court reconsider the constitutional permissibility of advisory opinions based
solely on the best evidence now available of the original public meaning of
Article III?
In my judgment, which I would again expect nearly all lawyers schooled
in American constitutional practice to share, the answer would be clearly not.
The question posed in my hypothetical case has been settled through liquida-
tion, the results of which judicial precedent has now ratified.  At an early
point in our history, The Correspondence of the Justices and the acceptance of its
rationale by the Supreme Court, presidents, and the American public placed
advisory opinions in the category of the constitutionally forbidden.316  Since
then, the President and Congress have functioned tolerably successfully with-
out them.  Subsequent judicial decisions adverting to the impermissibility of
advisory opinions317 constitute just one further consideration helping to
mark the question as beyond reconsideration based solely on evidence of
Article III’s original public meaning.
c. Expansion of the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction
Chief Justice John Marshall hinged his analysis in Marbury v. Madison318
on the proposition that Congress, by purporting to vest the Supreme Court
with original jurisdiction in a case in which Article III limited the Court to
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, had presented the question whether
the Court must give effect to an unconstitutional law.319  In an article pub-
lished in 2007, Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson argue at length
that Marshall’s analysis contravened the original public meaning of Article
III.320  According to them, the Constitution’s enumeration of cases within
the Court’s original jurisdiction established a floor, not a ceiling.321  If Cala-
bresi and Lawson are right, and if the original public meaning controls, Con-
gress, today, could expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
But does and should the original public meaning govern?  The answer
that emerges from the implicit norms of constitutional practice is, I submit,
decisively negative.  The most relevant legal history is not the history bearing
on the original public meaning of Article III, but the historical status of Mar-
bury v. Madison.  Today Marbury stands as perhaps the most iconic precedent
in the federal courts canon and, indeed, in American constitutional law more
316 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (holding
that federal courts must not enter “a hypothetical judgment—which comes to the same
thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning”).
318 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
319 See id. at 176 (“The question, whether an act repugnant to the constitution, can
become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States . . . .”).
320 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1002 (2007).
321 See id. at 1038.
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generally.322  It would take much more than new evidence about the original
public meaning of Article III to justify overruling Marbury on a point material
to its central holding, especially when nothing in the intervening years has
revealed the unworkability of the Court’s decision and historical circum-
stances have not changed in relevant respects.
d. State Court Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Protect Against
Unlawful Federal Detention
Through much of the nineteenth century, state courts asserted habeas
corpus jurisdiction to inquire into the lawfulness of detentions by federal
officials.323  Many federal courts scholars believe that the state courts that did
so stood on firm constitutional ground.324  In their view, the Constitution—
as properly originally understood—relied on state judiciaries to safeguard
against deprivations of liberty by the executive branch if Congress should
decline to create lower federal courts, as Article III contemplates that it
might have.  But the Supreme Court reached a contrary judgment in several
nineteenth century cases culminating in Tarble’s Case.325  Over the dissent of
Chief Justice Chase,326 the Court reasoned in Tarble’s Case that the constitu-
tional supremacy of the federal government over state governments implied
the impermissibility of state courts asserting habeas corpus jurisdiction over
federal officials.327
Suppose that a state court, today, were to assert habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion to review the lawfulness of the detention by military officials of a mem-
ber of the United States armed forces.  Should the Supreme Court
reexamine the jurisdictional question, based solely on evidence involving the
Constitution’s original public meaning?  In my judgment, the answer would
again be no—provided that, as in Tarble’s Case, a federal court would have
jurisdiction to entertain a comparable habeas petition.328
An obvious consideration involves stare decisis. Tarble’s Case has stood
for over 100 years without proving either practically unworkable or otherwise
normatively problematic.  In this case, however, unlike those that I have dis-
cussed previously, my appeal to stare decisis includes an important proviso.
Absent the availability of federal habeas jurisdiction, which formed a part of
the background to Tarble’s Case of which the Supreme Court explicitly took
322 For an argument that Marbury’s ascent to that status did not occur immediately, but
began only during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Keith E. Whitting-
ton & Amanda Rinderle, Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction
of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 823 (2012).
323 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 402–04.
324 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509
(1987); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2565 (1998).
325 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
326 See id. at 412–13 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
327 See id. at 407 (majority opinion).
328 See id. at 412.
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note, a holding that the Constitution precluded state court jurisdiction would
raise practical and moral red flags.  Potentially at stake, as Chief Justice Chase
protested in his dissenting opinion, would be the right of citizens to protec-
tion “against arbitrary imprisonment in a large class of cases.”329
In appraising whether a state court could exercise habeas corpus juris-
diction in a case brought by a member of the armed services to challenge her
detention by federal officials, I would therefore hesitate to rely on stare deci-
sis alone if Congress had somehow validly cut off federal habeas corpus juris-
diction.  The practical and constitutional stakes would be too high.  Whether
Congress could in fact withdraw federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in circum-
stances not involving rebellion or invasion330 is of course at least highly
doubtful under Boumediene v. Bush,331 a case that I shall discuss separately
below.  But if we put Boumediene to one side, or imagine that Congress had
purported to preclude federal jurisdiction while signaling its preparedness to
accept state court jurisdiction or possibly even authorizing it, I would antici-
pate a near consensus that the correctness of the ruling in Tarble’s Case ought
to be reexamined, partly in light of evidence of the original public meaning
of the Suspension Clause.  As I have emphasized, no sensible person believes
that the original public meaning never matters in constitutional analysis, nor
that stare decisis should always prevail.
In order to resolve the case that I initially imagined, however, a judge
would not need to confront the hypothetical issue of state judicial power in
the absence of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.  A court reviewing the
imagined statute would do best to hold that when Congress vests the lower
federal courts with jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of detentions by the
federal executive branch—as the initial hypothetical imagines that it has
done—it impliedly precludes state court jurisdiction.332  If the case were
decided on this basis, it would present no occasion to decide whether the
rationale of Tarble’s Case would prevail, or what bearing it would have, if no
mechanism existed by which a federal court could review the lawfulness of
detentions by the federal executive branch alleged to violate the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States.333
329 Id. at 413 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
330 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
331 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
332 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 405 (explicating this possible basis for
decision).
333 If we instead imagine a hypothetical situation in which Congress had explicitly
sought to remove the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts, without express allusion to the
possibility of state court jurisdiction, the case would resemble Boumediene in several
respects, including this: as a matter of statutory interpretation, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress would have wanted to bar federal jurisdiction if it knew that the constitutionally man-
dated alternative to federal habeas review would be state court habeas jurisdiction.  And,
absent more facts, such as a constitutionally valid suspension of the writ, Boumediene would
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* * *
Although I could easily amass further examples, doing so would advance
no good purpose.  The two most salient points should have emerged with
sufficient clarity.  First, although evidence of original meaning matters cru-
cially to constitutional adjudication, nearly everyone schooled in constitu-
tional practice also acknowledges—at least when not pushed into
methodological combat—that original history should not always trump other
historically based considerations.  Second, implicit norms and conventions of
legal practice will frequently produce convergent conclusions among judges
and lawyers about which historical considerations matter most in particular
cases.  In short, a common law-like approach neither invites nor licenses ram-
pant judicial subjectivity with regard to a broad swathe of issues.
2. Hard Cases
Once again, however, I do not wish to claim too much.  In the federal
courts canon as elsewhere, hard as well as easy cases arise.  For illustrative
purposes, I shall discuss just two.  In the first, Boumediene v. Bush,334 method-
ological concerns involving the pertinence of diverse historical factors specifi-
cally divided the Supreme Court.  A second, equally divisive set of cases in
which originalist arguments have played large roles focuses on issues of state
sovereign immunity.  In discussing these cases, the single point that I would
emphasize most strongly is that any argument in favor of exclusive original-
ism cuts against the grain of nearly everyone’s sense of appropriate method-
ology in the “easy” cases that I canvassed above.  So recognizing, nonexclusive
originalists will frequently find themselves in the same methodological boat
with nonoriginalists, even in hard cases.
a. Boumediene v. Bush
No case in the federal courts canon more vividly exhibits judicial disa-
greement about issues of interpretive methodology than Boumediene v.
Bush.335  In response to a constitutional challenge to the Military Commis-
sions Act’s (MCA) partial stripping of habeas jurisdiction, the Government
maintained that the Suspension Clause conferred no rights on noncitizens
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States at Guantanamo
Bay.336  The Supreme Court disagreed in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy in
which the majority implicitly if not explicitly rejected claims that original
public meanings—as they best can be reconstructed—necessarily determine
the outcome even of cases of first impression.  According to Justice Kennedy,
preclude the withdrawal of all habeas jurisdiction to review the executive detention of pris-
oners held within the United States or at Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
334 553 U.S. 723.
335 Id.
336 See id. at 739.
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a prior case, INS v. St. Cyr,337 had established that “ ‘at the absolute mini-
mum’ the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ [of habeas corpus] as it
existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”338  But the Court’s
cases, Justice Kennedy continued, “ha[d] been careful not to foreclose the
possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded
along with post-1789 developments that define the present scope of the
writ.”339
In finding that the MCA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision violated the
Suspension Clause, Justice Kennedy first examined pertinent evidence con-
cerning the Clause’s original public meaning and pronounced it inconclu-
sive with respect to the specific question before the Court.  The issue, he
explained, was one that the Founding generation could not have anticipated,
due to “the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers of
terrorism in the modern age.”340  “[D]eclin[ing] . . . to infer too much, one
way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on point,”341 Justice
Kennedy reviewed a variety of judicial precedents, all decided during the
twentieth century, involving “the Constitution’s extraterritorial applica-
tion.”342  Their outcomes, he determined, reflected the principle that “ques-
tions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns,
not formalism.”343  After identifying a variety of objective factors and practi-
cal concerns, he concluded that whatever “practical obstacles” might attend
the extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to noncitizen prisoners in other
foreign locales, the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay,” a
territory “over which the Government has total military and civil control.”344
Justice Scalia wrote for four dissenters who denied the applicability of
the Suspension Clause to noncitizens at Guantanamo.345  In his view, the
Court’s analysis should have ended with its inquiry into the Suspension
Clause’s original public meaning.346  Absent clear evidence that the Found-
ing generation would have viewed the MCA as unconstitutional, he thought
the Court had no legal basis for invalidating the statute’s relevant
provision.347
In appraising the methodological disagreement between the majority
and dissenting opinions in Boumediene, we should aim first for precision of
337 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
338 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301).
339 Id. (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300–01).
340 Id. at 752.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 755.
343 Id. at 764.
344 Id. at 747, 771.
345 See id. at 826 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing).  In a separate dissenting opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the same Justices
also argued that even if the Suspension Clause applied, the MCA did not violate it. See id.
at 801–26 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
346 See id. at 832–34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
347 See id.
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description.  Justice Kennedy did not contest the relevance of originalist his-
torical inquiry to constitutional analysis.  To the contrary, he conducted such
an inquiry.  Nevertheless, as between him and the dissenters, multiple bones
of contention emerged, including the best interpretation of both originalist
history348 and the precedent most centrally on point, Johnson v. Eisentrager.349
At the outset of his dissent, Justice Scalia framed the central method-
ological disagreement between himself and the majority as involving a con-
junction of issues, comprising not only the authority of original public
meanings, but also of rules of interpretation that, he said, mandated judicial
deference to Congress and the President.  “In light of . . . principles” that call
for judicial deference to legislative and executive decisions in the domains of
foreign and military affairs, he wrote, the Court had “no choice but to affirm”
the validity of the challenged provision of the Military Commissions Act once
it determined that originalist sources did not point clearly to a conclusion of
unconstitutionality.350
In my view, the principles of deference to which Justice Scalia appealed
in Boumediene made the case a genuinely hard one.  Countering, Justice Ken-
nedy cited a general constitutional principle favoring recognition of judicial
authority to “say ‘what the law is.’”351  But that principle needs more careful,
narrower statement than Justice Kennedy gave it.  A variety of constitutional
doctrines, prominently including standing and the political question doc-
trine, sometimes preclude the judicial department from saying what the law
is, as the Court occasionally emphasizes.352  Nevertheless, Justice Scalia
claimed too much when he stated as a categorical matter that principles of
judicial deference in disputes involving foreign affairs should yield only to
clear evidence of contrary original public meanings.353  Above I discussed a
hypothetical case in which Congress purported to authorize the President to
seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court.  An authorizing statute
would be unconstitutional, I argued, even if the original public meaning of
Article III did not clearly forbid advisory opinions.  That judgment would
remain secure even if the imagined provision for advisory opinions extended
only to issues bearing on foreign affairs, with respect to which Congress and
the President claimed entitlement to interpretive deference.  In The Corre-
spondence of the Justices, Secretary of State Jefferson had cited delicate foreign
348 See id. at 834–41 (disputing the majority’s account of the original history and con-
cluding that the writ of habeas corpus did not extend to noncitizens outside the territory of
the United States).
349 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 834–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
puting the majority’s interpretation of Eisentrager).
350 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 832 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351 Id. at 765 (majority opinion) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
352 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (standing); Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (political question).
353 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 832 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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relations implications among President Washington’s reasons for seeking
judicial advice.354
A later passage in Justice Scalia’s Boumediene dissent can be read—
though perhaps it does not need to be—as asserting even more categorically
that because “the text and history of the Suspension Clause provide no basis
for” the Court’s ruling, that ruling would have remained indefensible “even
if” precedent had supported it.355  As I have emphasized, sometimes the orig-
inal public meaning does and ought to dictate the outcome of constitutional
disputes, notwithstanding contrary T2 interpretations.  As I have also empha-
sized, however, the original public meaning is not always decisive.  Accord-
ingly, to the extent that the Boumediene dissent may have intended to rest on
categorical claims about the authority of original public meanings (without
need for invocation of special principles of judicial deference), it bore an
unmet burden of explanation.  If the original public meaning does not nec-
essarily govern in the “easy” cases that I discussed above, then why should it
have dictated the outcome in Boumediene?
At the end of the day, the result in Boumediene depended on the integra-
tion, weighing, and balancing of a mix of historically rooted factors among
others.  Normative concerns played an appropriate role, despite the obvi-
ousness of normative disagreement between the majority (which worried
about Guantanamo becoming a zone of judicially unchecked governmental
prerogative) and the dissenters (who feared a dangerous judicial interfer-
ence with executive and military authority to combat international terror-
ism).356  As I have said, good judging requires good judgment, even and
perhaps especially when judges differ in their normative assessments.  How-
ever one concludes that the case should have come out, its difficulty should
be acknowledged.  It would be not merely superficial, but also inaccurate, to
characterize Boumediene as flatly pitting the claims of a stringent version of
exclusive originalism, on the one hand, against those of a rival theory that
wholly rejects the authority of the dead hand of the past, on the other.357
354 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 50–51 (quoting Secretary Jefferson’s letter
as reporting that misinterpretation of the law by the executive branch might prove “dan-
gerous to the peace of the United States”).
355 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 849 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In sum, because I conclude that
the text and history of the Suspension Clause provide no basis for our jurisdiction, I would
affirm the Court of Appeals even if Eisentrager did not govern these cases.”).
356 Compare id. at 765 (majority opinion) (“The necessary implication of the [Govern-
ment’s] argument is that by surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated ter-
ritory to a third party, while at the same time entering into a lease that grants total control
over the territory back to the United States, it would be possible for the political branches
to govern without legal constraint.”), with id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Henceforth, as
today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear, how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will
ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the
subject entails.”).
357 Indeed, I do not even read Justice Kennedy’s opinion as foreclosing the possibility
that clear original meaning could have trumped T2 precedent.  Despite his avowal that the
Court had “not . . . foreclose[d] the possibility” that the protections of the Suspension
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b. State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
In a series of closely divided cases decided during the 1990s, centrally
including Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida358 and Alden v. Maine,359 the
Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh and Tenth Amendments as giving
robust protection to state sovereign immunity.360  In both Seminole Tribe and
Alden, the majority and dissenting opinions jousted about the pertinence of
particular judicial precedents.  But the Seminole Tribe majority, in particular,
emphasized that it thought Hans v. Louisiana,361 decided in 1890, had cor-
rectly grasped and applied the original public meaning when it held that the
Eleventh Amendment immunized the states from unconsented suit by private
citizens.362  Though written by Justices who never claimed to be exclusive
originalists, the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe also rested their judg-
ments about the inapplicability of state sovereign immunity principally on
arguments purporting to establish the original meanings of Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment.363
All agree that Congress drafted and the states ratified the Eleventh
Amendment in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Geor-
gia,364 which held that the state’s plea of sovereign immunity could not sur-
vive the language of Article III that authorizes federal jurisdiction of suits
between a state and citizens of another state.365  The modern dispute con-
cerns the scope of the Eleventh Amendment’s repudiation of Chisholm.  In
the view of the majority Justices in Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment
categorically ratified the states’ preexisting sovereign immunity from uncon-
sented suits against them by private individuals.366  In the view of the dissent-
Clause might have expanded over time, id. at 746 (majority opinion), his determination
that the original meaning was relevantly unclear meant that he had no occasion to con-
clude that precedent could authoritatively supersede the Clause’s original meaning in a
case in which that meaning was clear and relevantly determinate.
358 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
359 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
360 Although earlier cases had treated issues involving state sovereign immunity as aris-
ing under the Eleventh Amendment and Article III, Alden treated the question whether
states may claim immunity from suit in their own courts as having a Tenth Amendment
dimension. See id. at 713–14, 739.
361 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
362 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (“Hans—with a much closer vantage point than the
dissent—recognized that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood
meaning of the Constitution.”).
363 See id. at 110 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(“The history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it reaches
only suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity
Clauses.”); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“While sovereign immunity entered many state legal systems as part
of the common law . . . , it was not understood to be indefeasible or to have been given any
such status by the new National Constitution . . . .”).
364 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
365 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
366 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69–72.
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ers, by contrast, the Eleventh Amendment carefully identifies Chisholm’s
mistake in permitting an unconsented suit against a state by citizens of
another state whose only basis for bringing an action in federal court, to
assert a claim predicated on state law, lay in Article III’s grant of diversity
jurisdiction.  According to the dissenting Justices, neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor the Tenth constitutionally immunized the states from suits
brought by their own citizens that allege violations of the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.367  The literal language of the Eleventh
Amendment does not reach such actions, the dissenters emphasized.368
They also maintained that principles of sound government well recognized
by the Founding generation called for the availability of federal jurisdiction
to enforce the states’ obligations under federal law.369
In my view, the dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe and Alden offered
more persuasive accounts of the Constitution’s language and history than did
the majority opinions.370  The “diversity theory” of the Eleventh Amendment
that underlies the principal dissent in Seminole Tribe—which holds that the
Eleventh Amendment erected a categorical bar only against those federal
court suits against states that are predicated on the diversity of citizenship
between a private plaintiff and a defendant state—makes sense of the
Amendment’s otherwise puzzling language while permitting Congress to
authorize federal jurisdiction in suits under the Constitution, laws, and trea-
ties of the United States in which the supremacy of federal law may be at
stake.  To anticipate a theme that I shall develop more fully below, I also have
no quarrel with the dissenting Justices’ decision to let originalist history
occupy analytical center stage.  If the best evidence bearing on original pub-
367 See id. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
368 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 109–10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (identifying “two plausi-
ble readings” of the language of the Eleventh Amendment, neither consistent with the
majority’s conclusion).
369 Id. at 155 (“Given the Framers’ general concern with curbing abuses by state gov-
ernments, it would be amazing if the scheme of delegated powers embodied in the Consti-
tution had left the National Government powerless to render the States judicially
accountable for violations of federal rights.”).
370 In another challenge to the dissenters’ position, Bradford Clark, supra note 27,
argues that the Founding generation broadly believed that Congress could not impose
statutory duties on the sovereign states and that states could not be sued for constitutional
violations.  Against the background of that understanding, he maintains, the Eleventh
Amendment had the clear, limited purpose of correcting Chisholm’s mistaken conclusion
that Article III permitted out-of-state citizens to sue states in federal court based on diver-
sity of citizenship, and that it understandably left unaltered, without further comment, the
still-settled understanding that Congress could not regulate the states or subject them to
suit.  Here suffice it to say that Professor Clark’s historical conclusions are not obviously
correct, see, e.g., Carlos M. Va´zquez, The Unsettled Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. F.
79, 79–80 (2011), and that their adoption into constitutional doctrine would contravene
the holding of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 528 (1985), that
Congress has broad power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state activities (even if
it cannot subject the states to unconsented suits for violation of their statutory duties).
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lic meaning points toward a sensible result and does not contravene settled
precedent, there may be no need to go further.  Finally, I believe that the
Seminole Tribe and Alden dissents derived stronger support from precedent
than did the Court’s majority.  To decide Seminole Tribe as it did, the Court
had to overrule Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.371  Although Union Gas was a
recent precedent, decided without majority opinion by a narrowly divided
Court, the Seminole Tribe majority acknowledged that it could not be distin-
guished persuasively and that it would control unless overruled.372  By con-
trast, the dissent could distinguish Hans v. Louisiana on the ground that it,
unlike Union Gas and Seminole Tribe, did not involve a congressionally author-
ized cause of action.373  In Alden, which permitted states to claim sovereign
immunity from suit in state as well as federal court, I believe that the dissent-
ing opinion’s arguments were even more compelling.  To reach its conclu-
sion, the majority had to rely on tenuous distinctions of a litany of cases.374
These, however, are conclusory observations, not arguments, and I offer
them principally to mark a transition to the central point that I wish to make
here.  As we look to the future, the decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden now
possess the status of nonoriginalist historical fact.  The doctrine of stare deci-
sis applies.  The question is whether those who reject the Seminole and Alden
decisions’ historical and textual analysis, or otherwise find their reasoning
unpersuasive, should acquiesce.  In a characteristically thoughtful article, my
colleague David Shapiro has answered yes.375  As Shapiro emphasizes, “the
doctrine [of sovereign immunity] as it has evolved” includes numerous “loop-
holes and limitations.”376  Of perhaps greatest significance, although the
Eleventh Amendment (as construed by the Supreme Court) normally bars
suits in which the plaintiff names a state or state agency as the defendant, it
typically permits suits pleaded against state officials in which a plaintiff seeks
prospective injunctive relief.377  Other remaining avenues of possible relief
include actions for damages against government officials in their individual
capacities,378 suits by the United States,379 actions authorized by Congress
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,380 and bankruptcy
371 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
372 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63–66.
373 See id. at 69.
374 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 936–37 (noting that “[t]he majority’s treat-
ment of precedent raised a number of questions” involving Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S.
211 (1908); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410
(1979)).
375 David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection,
86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008).
376 Id. at 956.
377 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
378 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
379 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
380 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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proceedings.381  Admittedly, the scheme of remedies available under current
law has important gaps.  Because officials sued in their individual capacities
enjoy one or another form of official immunity,382 compensatory relief is
often unavailable.  In its absence, some victims of rights violations will lack
either standing or adequate incentives to sue for injunctions.383  Other
“loopholes,” though available in theory, seldom apply.
Nevertheless, Professor Shapiro persuades me that the prevailing doctri-
nal equilibrium, in which injunctions are normally available against ongoing
violations of federal rights, is at least functionally tolerable (even though well
short of ideal).  Thus persuaded, I also concur in his assessment that stare
decisis ought to control.384  All who agree with Professor Shapiro and me
about the incorrectness of the initial decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden
should at least recognize that the stare decisis question is now a serious one,
even if they would resolve it differently.
What I want to emphasize, however, is that acknowledging the difficulty
of this issue should occasion no embarrassment to proponents of a common
law-like approach.  Decisions about whether to overrule precedents that were
wrongly decided at T2 frequently ought to be experienced as difficult at T3.
I shall say more about the difficulty of the issues originally presented in Semi-
nole Tribe and Alden below.
C. Hard and Easy Cases: Some Generalizations About When Originalist
Considerations Do and Do Not (and Should and Should Not) Prevail
In pointing out the possibility of broad convergence concerning proper
constitutional outcomes even in the absence of canonical rules assigning lexi-
cal priorities to competing, historically grounded considerations—a conver-
gence, I want to emphasize, that includes both most originalists and most
nonoriginalists—I have so far relied on an intuitive distinction between
“easy” cases and “hard” ones.  Although the terms of that distinction defy
formal definition, in this Section I shall try to provide a bit more elucidation.
By doing so, I hope to lay the foundation for—and then to advance—some
generalizations concerning when originalist considerations deserve to
predominate in constitutional debate.  In my view, the generalizations that I
shall offer are both descriptively and normatively important ones.  Neverthe-
381 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
382 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
383 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653 (2000).
384 Among the arguments for denying strong stare decisis effect to Seminole Tribe and
Alden is that the doctrine may be too internally conflicted to be deemed settled, partly as a
result of Katz, 546 U.S. 356, which held that the Court’s determination in Seminole Tribe
that Congress lacked Article I power to subject the states to unconsented suit did not apply
to the Bankruptcy Clause.  As Justice Thomas argued in dissent, Katz is difficult if not
impossible to reconcile persuasively with Seminole Tribe. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note
67, at 927.  For a rejection of Professor Shapiro’s position and an argument that Seminole
Tribe and Alden ought to be overruled, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Exhuming the “Diversity
Explanation” of the Eleventh Amendment, 65 ALA. L. REV. 457 (2013).
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less, they are only generalizations, offered in the provisional spirit of a com-
mon law-like approach.
Hard and easy cases, as I have used the terms, can be distinguished along
two dimensions.  One involves the judgments of particular people, the other
the potential for reasonable disagreement.  With regard to both, the starting
point for analysis lies in a recognition that the implicit norms of American
constitutional practice reflect commitments to two fundamental and occa-
sionally competing goals.  Roughly described, they are the goals of getting
matters settled, if not by the Constitution then by T2 precedents or prac-
tice,385 on the one hand, and of achieving just and practical outcomes, on
the other.386
It could go almost without saying that individual interpreters will almost
invariably experience cases as easy when all pertinent historical considera-
tions point to a conclusion that they regard as reasonably workable and just.
Where the salient historical factors cohere, judicial embarkation on a bold
new course would require the assertion of a raw form of judicial power that
our practice strongly disfavors, even if it does not preclude it entirely.  Put-
ting aside cases in which judges and Justices may believe that practical or
moral imperatives might justify them in testing the outer limits of judicial
power,387 and keeping in mind the sometimes competing interests in getting
matters settled and getting matters settled wisely, I would offer three further
generalizations for which the analysis of Parts I, II, and III provides support.
First, when no overt conflict exists among the various possible mecha-
nisms of settlement by history, and when the settlement to which at least one
such mechanism (such as the original understanding, precedent, liquidation
through practice, or historical gloss) decisively points is reasonably just and
practical, cases involving the associated rule of decision will normally prove
easy.  Of the “easy” cases that I discussed above, the one imagining congres-
sional abolition of life tenure for federal judges most directly exemplifies this
proposition.  Outside the distorting vortex of partisan controversy, the perti-
nent original understanding or public meaning of Article III seems reasona-
bly clear.  No settled practice or squarely on-point judicial precedent deviates
385 For a highly influential but also controversial argument that achieving settlement is
the foremost goal of the Constitution and surrounding interpretive practice, see Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1359 (1997).
386 See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 101–11 (explaining the distinction between getting
matters settled and getting matters settled correctly and emphasizing the primacy of the
Constitution’s text and originally understood meaning when the former is more important
than the latter).
387 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Interpreting Presidential Powers, 63 DUKE L.J. 347 (2013)
(defending a two-tiered approach to the interpretation of presidential powers that can
justify expansive conclusions about presidential authority in cases of extraordinary
exigency).
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from this baseline historical norm.388  In addition, the protection of judges
against removal for partisan reasons accords with modern rule-of-law ideals.
Second, in cases in which the T2 historical settlement of an issue by prac-
tice or precedent is reasonably just and practical as measured by current
norms, judges, Justices, and other well socialized participants in constitu-
tional practice will normally accept it even if the best evidence of T1 public
meaning might point to a contrary conclusion.  This, I think, is the best
explanation for the second and third of the “easy” cases that I discussed,
involving advisory opinions and expansion of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction.  More generally, I know of no cases in which the Supreme Court
has rejected longstanding practice or clearly on-point precedent to return to
the original public meaning of constitutional language when a majority of
the Justices thought that doing so produced an unjust or practically regretta-
ble result.  I put the point with caution, however, in light of cases in which
the Justices have professed indifference to the practical consequences of
reverting to a conclusion that the Constitution’s original meaning dictates.389
Third, matters once settled by precedent can come unsettled when sub-
sequent decisions undermine the methodological foundations of an earlier
case and its revision would not produce significantly untoward practical con-
sequences.  The Supreme Court’s recent reexamination of prudential stand-
ing may be best explained on this basis.390  At the same time, the Court’s
hesitation about pressing revisions to their logical limit—for example, by
renouncing all of prudential standing doctrine root and branch—bespeaks a
reluctance to upset too much practically sensible, workable doctrine.
By contrast, I would conjecture that cases are most likely to be hard for
individuals when pertinent historical considerations at least initially appear
to be misaligned with one another391 and the interest in achieving just and
388 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803), in which the Supreme Court might have
addressed the issue, almost wholly avoids it.  For a discussion of the surrounding political
climate and the Supreme Court’s avoidance of the highly charged issue of the constitution-
ality of divesting confirmed judges of their judgeships, see ACKERMAN, supra note 101, at
163–76.
389 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2011) (invalidating a provision of
the Bankruptcy Act insofar as it authorized adjudication by a bankruptcy court of common
law counterclaims against an estate and observing that, despite arguments that the decision
“will create significant delays and impose additional costs on the bankruptcy process,”
“‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitu-
tion’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (invali-
dating a decades-old practice of legislative vetoes reflected in more than 200 statutes on
originalist and textualist grounds and observing that “[t]here is no support in the Constitu-
tion or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays
often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided”).
390 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1385–88
(2014).
391 Cf. Fallon, supra note 129 (emphasizing the interdependence of different kinds of
argument and the capacity of arguments within one category to trigger a reconsideration
of other arguments in different categories).
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practical outcomes exerts a pressure to deviate from a currently prevailing
settlement.  For me, as I indicated above, the question whether Supreme
Court Justices should now adhere to Seminole Tribe and Alden, even if they
think those decisions mistaken, occupies this category.  In my view, the rul-
ings in those cases not only reflect error, but also have undesirable, even if
not disastrous, practical consequences.  But not every case inviting a rejection
of practice or precedent need occasion apprehensions of difficulty.
For the most part, the more important that a question is for practical
purposes, the stronger the interest in getting it settled right.  I thus said
above that the case for accepting Seminole Tribe and Alden depended in part
on the argument that those cases seldom frustrate the effective implementa-
tion of federal law, largely due to the availability of suits for injunctive
relief.392  Correspondingly, my reluctance to accede to all aspects of the con-
stitutional holding in Tarble’s Case reflects the potential importance of the
question in issue, involving the availability or non-availability of habeas
corpus relief if—and this is a “big ‘if’” in the aftermath of Boumediene—cir-
cumstances could permissibly develop in which federal habeas jurisdiction
did not exist.393  In this and other cases, an important practical function of
appeals to original meanings is to support arguments for rejecting currently
prevailing settlements in the interest of getting matters settled right, as mea-
sured by normative as well as historical standards.394
The other dimension along which hard and easy questions can be distin-
guished reflects the scope of disagreement within our constitutional culture.
Seminole Tribe furnishes an illustration.  For the Justices in the majority, the
case presumably did not seem a difficult one.  They thought that both the
original public meaning and the most important precedents—a category
from which they excluded the squarely on-point ruling in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,395 which issued from a divided Court without a majority opin-
ion—supported their position.  Indeed, they felt a sufficient commitment to
that position to decide a spate of cases substantially revising and invigorating
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity during the decade of the 1990s.396
392 See supra notes 375–84 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 329–33 and accompanying text.
394 This recognition appears to have animated first-generation originalists. See John
Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 83–84
(2003) (emphasizing first-generation originalists’ dislike for liberal Warren Court prece-
dents); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–602
(2004) (noting ideological outlook of early originalists); see also Balkin, supra note 2, at 675
(maintaining that the liberal Justices of the Warren Court era had also turned to “adoption
history” when they “needed a source of authority beyond precedent” to overturn long-
standing precedent and “remake the constitutional status quo in the image of legal
liberalism”).
395 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
396 In addition to Seminole Tribe, see for example Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999),
and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999). See also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (extending
state sovereign immunity to proceedings before a federal administrative agency).
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Interestingly, the dissenting Justices also appear to have believed unequivo-
cally and even passionately that both the original public meaning and the
best arguments from precedent supported their side.397  From an external
perspective, however, both the pro- and anti-sovereign immunity camps had
plausible arguments.  Defined in light of reasonable disagreement, hard
cases require the exercise of judgment that is not only disputable, but actu-
ally disputed; they mark the limits of the consensus and convergence that
happily predominate—even if only increasingly precariously—within Ameri-
can constitutional practice.  In emphasizing the constraints that practice-
based norms establish, a common law-like approach to the significance of
varied historical considerations in constitutional adjudication must also
acknowledge the limits of those constraints.398
D. Two Puzzles Dissolved
Having defended a practice-based, common law-like approach to the
role of history in constitutional adjudication in which the original meaning
of constitutional language is always pertinent, but not always decisive, I
should conclude this Part by addressing, head-on, what may appear to be two
mysteries about originalist analysis.  The first involves the apparent invoca-
tion of exclusive originalist premises in some cases by judges and Justices who
demonstrably eschew exclusive originalism in others.  The second arises from
the tacit willingness of nonoriginalists to analyze some cases exclusively or
nearly exclusively in originalist terms.
1. Sometimes Exclusive Originalism
My argument that almost no one adheres consistently to exclusive
originalism leaves a puzzle: How should we account for assertions in constitu-
tional debate—including passages in important Supreme Court opinions—
that appear to rely on exclusively originalist premises?  For example, Justice
Scalia’s Boumediene dissent includes language that could be read this way,
even though—as I have suggested—it does not need to be.399  At least for
Supreme Court Justices, none of whom has ever adhered consistently to an
exclusively originalist stance,400 the best explanation may be that prescrip-
397 Among other measures, the same four Justices persisted in dissent in cases applying
decisions extending sovereign immunity and, joined by Justice O’Connor, effectively cre-
ated an exception to the prior sovereign immunity rulings for cases involving Congress’s
exercise of the bankruptcy power. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.  As recently
as the 2013 Term, Justice Ginsburg stated that she is still not reconciled. See Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2056 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (predicting
that the “immoderate . . . immunity” upheld in cases such as Seminole Tribe and Alden “will
[not] have staying power”).
398 On the interaction of the “internal” and “external” constraints that individual
judges and Justices experience, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2009).
399 See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
400 See Fallon, supra note 184, at 1129–30.
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tions for decision on exclusively originalist grounds reflect a default position,
not an invariant imperative.  Justice Scalia, for instance, has written that the
principle of stare decisis represents a sometime “exception” to his otherwise
textualist and originalist philosophy.401
If advanced as a default position only, and stated with sufficient abstrac-
tion, the proposition that clear original understandings or public meanings
should govern constitutional controversies should provoke no dissent, as I
have recognized already.  Even defenders of a common law approach to con-
stitutional adjudication acknowledge that relevant meanings of plain text
should determine outcomes absent significant contravening reasons.402  That
said, genuinely exclusive originalism has champions in the academic commu-
nity, if not on the bench.403  Under these circumstances, it would help con-
siderably to clarify the actual stakes of methodological debate if judicial
opinions displayed more caution in using what might appear to be exclusive
originalist rhetoric.
2. Originalist Analysis by Nonoriginalists
A related puzzle is why nonoriginalist Justices would conduct their analy-
ses largely if not exclusively on originalist grounds in cases such as District of
Columbia v. Heller404 and Seminole Tribe.405  In light of what I have just said,
however, that is a pseudo-puzzle, not a real one.  As I have emphasized, every-
one agrees that original understandings and original public meanings matter
to constitutional analysis.  They may even represent an agreed starting point
in cases in which prior judicial precedent has not established a controlling
doctrinal framework.  Moreover, when original understandings or public
meanings yield a practically sensible conclusion that other potentially rele-
vant considerations (such as precedent) do not contraindicate, no norm of
practice requires analysis to go further.  Any confusion emanating from Heller
and Seminole Tribe should dissipate against this background.  Once again,
however, it would have helped to safeguard against misunderstanding for the
dissenting Justices in those cases to have made clear that they were at most
presumptive rather than exclusive originalists or adhered only to a weaker
analogue of the fixation thesis.
401 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 413–14; cf. Paulsen, Intrinsically Corrupting
Influence, supra note 183, at 289–90 (arguing that regardless of the criteria that a theory
might uphold as properly determinative of constitutional meaning, only corruption can
result from requiring an otherwise justified theory to accommodate precedents that the
theory must mark as mistaken).
402 See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 103–04 (explaining the importance of settling
constitutional matters based on common ground).
403 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
404 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
405 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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CONCLUSION
History matters pervasively to constitutional adjudication, both generally
and in the domain of federal courts law.  In this Article, although my con-
cerns are general, I have focused especially closely on the federal courts
canon, where methodological debates have flared only infrequently and
where common ground is therefore easier to discern than in some other
fields.  In no area of constitutional law, however, should debates about the
merits and demerits of originalism—of which there are multiple, sometimes
significantly divergent subspecies—obscure the varieties of historical consid-
erations to which the Supreme Court regularly, and frequently uncontrover-
sially, accords significance.  Apart from a few exclusive originalists and
probably even a smaller number of opponents of any control by “the dead
hand of the past,” nearly everyone agrees that historical factors sometimes
pertinent to constitutional adjudication may include: the linguistic and cul-
tural antecedents of constitutional law; Founding-era legal practice; the origi-
nal intentions and purposes of the Framers, original understandings, and the
original public meanings of constitutional language; historically early prac-
tices that effectively “liquidated” otherwise indeterminate constitutional
meanings; longstanding practices (even if not necessarily early ones) consti-
tuting a “gloss” on the Constitution’s text; tradition; the novelty of particular
kinds of challenged governmental action; contexts of transformational
change that require judicial synthesis of new law and prior law; the original
precedential significance of prior cases; facts that might tend to undermine
the authority of judicial precedents; changed circumstances; and historical
trend lines, especially with regard to interpretive assumptions and
methodology.
Against this sweeping background, thoughtful originalists and
nonoriginalists should recognize that they share not only significant common
ground, but also important common challenges—a number of which I have
sought to illuminate—in sorting out which historically grounded considera-
tions deserve to matter most under which circumstances.  Implicitly if not
explicitly, exclusive originalist theories frequently trade on the assumption
that original meanings are both historically discoverable and determinate in
their applications.  But the latter premise is often false.  Among the chal-
lenges for originalists and nonoriginalists alike is to determine when
nonoriginalist history can authoritatively give legal content to constitutional
language that was originally vague or ambiguous.  Closely related is the chal-
lenge of determining when the degree of vagueness or ambiguity becomes
significant enough to allow for possibly conclusive resolution by precedent or
practice.  Further shared challenges arise in applying the doctrine of stare
decisis.
Having framed these challenges, I have argued that no single, elegant
principle prescribes which sources of historical authority should dictate the
outcome in all cases.  But I have also argued, and sought to demonstrate by
example, that tacit norms of practice point to clear conclusions and produce
widespread convergence in judgment about which historical phenomena
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matter most in very many cases.  By doing so, those practice-based norms
largely obviate any apparent need to choose once and for all among grandly
abstract methodological theories.  The norms to which I have called atten-
tion are of course themselves vague and indeterminate in many applications.
They permit, and in some cases make urgent, a disciplined critical inquiry
into which of the many elements of the historical past that contribute to our
current law properly control the outcome of particular cases.  But a largely
bottom-up, case-by-case approach is, I believe, the most promising path to
progress in plumbing the actual and proper roles of historical inquiry in con-
stitutional law.  And that, today, is a vastly broader and much more important
topic of inquiry than the much mooted question of “Originalism: For or
Against?”.  It is past time for both originalists and nonoriginalists so to
recognize.
